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ABSTRACT MONTEREY CA 93943-5101
The Czech Republic, slated to be a future member of the North Atlantic Treaty
Organization in 1999, will likely occupy a weak position within NATO's decision-making
process.
The country's historical experience, its geo-strategic situation, and certain
economic factors have led Czech policy makers to the strategic decision to join NATO.
The Czech Republic's security and defense policy, together with its strategic political
culture will influence the country's future role in NATO. However, because it is a small
state and because of other inherent structural factors, the Czech Republic will probably fail
to occupy a position in NATO comparable with other small powers. This contrasts
directly with the case of the Netherlands, a small state in the Alliance which has managed
to become a reliable member and occupy an influential position. Although both countries
had similar motives for joining or having joined NATO, certain aspects of the Czech
Republic's policies and strategic political culture do not correspond with those of the
Dutch.
In order to enjoy fully the "security benefits" derived from a strong position in the
Alliance, as does the Netherlands, the Czech Republic's policy makers will have to readjust
its priorities in security and defense policy. In particular, it will have to endeavor to make
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This thesis is based on the premise that a small state, despite limits resulting from its
"smallness," 1 can significantly influence security benefits resulting from membership in a
military Alliance. The number of benefits that would favor solving a given state's security
concerns will depend, among other factors, on the position or role which that given state
possesses in the eyes of its allies. 2 Such a state's position in a military Alliance is built upon
the security and defense policy it contributes to the Alliance, and by the strategic, political
culture it develops to implement the policy.
As can be seen in Figure Ion the next page, any strategic decisions that a country
makes is based on three determinants: 1) its historical experiences; 2) its geo-strategic
situation; and 3) economic factors. From this decision, in turn, proceeds a certain security
and defense platform. Moreover, the three determinants of any strategic decision also
reflect themselves to certain extent in the ultimate security and defense policy.
In this paper, I will examine the most probable image of the Czech Republic which
will be perceived in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. 3 I will focus on major factors
1 Colin Clarke and Tony Payne, Politics, Security and Development in Small States ,
(London, Boston, Sydney, and Wellington: Allen & Unwin, 1987), p. ix. Authors cite
Benedict Burton's definition of "smallness" as: "notions of area, population, population
density, accessibility, economic resources, market size, degree of political development."
2
R. L. Rothstein, Alliance and Small Powers ( New York: Columbia University Press,
1968), p. 7.
3 The North Atlantic Treaty, Washington DC, 4th April 1949.
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Figure 1. Factors that Ultimately Affect a Country's Role in an Alliance
B. DEFINING CONCEPT
There are two basic strategies which small states generally implement in the arena
of international relations. First is the strategy of cohesion, or the small state as binding
agent. In this position, the small state can be seen as a bridge builder, mediator, facilitator,
good institutional citizen, selfless contributor, and/or helpful fixer.
Second is the strategy of opportunism and extraction. Such a state is seen as a
reluctant, security consumer. Of course, strategies of cohesion and opportunism/extraction
need not be mutually exclusive. 4 Both may be employed at the same time in alliances.
4
Allen Sens, "Small-State Security in Europe: Threats, Anxieties and Strategies After the
Cold War" in Small States and the Security Challenge in the New Europe , ed. Werner
Bauwens (London and Washington: Brassey's, 1996), pp. 90-93.
According to its particular posture to the Alliance on any given point, small members may
belong to one or the other category.
C. IMPORTANCE
For several reasons, the results of this study may be important to small states in
general, and to the Czech Republic NATO policy-makers, in particular. Firstly, a small state
learns what should be its contribution to an alliance to gain maximal security profit. Then,
Czech policymakers learn what they should do to achieve such a position within NATO to
gain the security profit from system of collective defense. Next, an early adjustment of
Czech policy to the stated recommendations will smooth the process of NATO
enlargement ratification. Finally, defining constraints upon the Czech Republic's integration
process in NATO will help the NATO community to focus their assistance efficiently on the
weaknesses of the process of enlargement.
Looking back to the first reason, treaties of alliance tend always to be advantageous
to smaller states. Small states tend to be weak states in the world hierarchy of power. In
their effort to resolve security concerns, they usually seek resources to bolster their national
security against both external threats (aggression) and internal threats (subversion). 5 A
treaty of alliance can be one such resource against these threats.
It is important to note that a treaty of alliance is seen by some policy theorists as a
product of international law with a major weakness. That is, the concerns of a sovereign
5 Hakan Wiberg, "Security Problems of Small Nations" in Small States and the Security
Challenge in the New Europe , ed. Werner Bauwens (London and Washington: Brassey's,
1996), p. 22.
state are superior to a rule of international law, so some states do not feel obliged to obey
it, since there is no punishment. Consequently, uncertainty manifests itself when notions of
common security (nuclear weapons for example) do not work any longer.
However, an agreement of collective defense, despite the mentioned shortcomings,
is the best tool for the security of a small state. A position of reliable ally in such an
exclusive club can help reduce any hesitation on the part of the other allies to respond
decisively and efficiently in the case of an aggressor's attack against their small 'reliable'
partner.
6
Second, knowledge of the conclusions resulting from this thesis can be useful to the
Czech Republic itself. In July 1 997, the Czech Republic, Poland, and Hungary received
invitations to join NATO in 1999. Adjusting to the attributes of the exemplary security and
defense policy (the adoption of which allows small NATO members to be labeled "reliable
allies"), together with profound development and the timely implementation of an
appropriate strategic political culture help facilitate new membership ratifications in the
parliaments ofNATO Allies. By following these recommendations, and by keeping on this
track during the beginning of the country's membership, the Czech Republic might persuade
partners in the Alliance to consider with favor the effort the Czech Republic has made to
shift from an image of passive security-consumer to valuable ally, and thus, to take her
membership in NATO more seriously.
The North Atlantic Treaty, Washington DC, 4th April 1949, Article 5.
4
Third, the conclusions of this thesis contradict opinions in the Czech Republic's
ongoing national political debate over how membership in NATO might cause the country
to lose its sovereignty, leaving its fate in the hands of its larger, more powerful allies. 7
Last, since the new-member ratification process has started in the national
parliaments of the NATO countries, 8 this study aspires to provide arguments to those
decision makers that describe the relevant limits, constraints, motives, and opportunities of
the Czech Republic in its current stage of membership application.
D. METHODOLOGY
To define the relative position of the Czech Republic in NATO, I will describe, in
this comparative case study, the case studies of the Netherlands and the Czech Republic. In
both cases, I will examine the impact of the determinants (history, geo-strategic situation,
and economic factors) and modulators (security and defense policies, and strategic political
culture) on the effort of a small state to build up a respectfiill postion within the Alliance. In
the Dutch case, I will describe the impact of the same modulators on the image of the
Netherlands in NATO. Further, I will compare and contrast both the Dutch and the Czech
cases to generate positive and negative correlations that may be meaningful with respect to
the Czech Republic's prospective position in NATO.
To formulate the recommendations for any Czech security and defense policy or
political culture that may be implemented, I will compare not only the modulators ofboth
7
Jan Pergler, "Vacek: Republika ztrati svou suverenitu," Lidove Noviny , May 5, 1997.
8
"Senat uz zacal jednat o alianci," Mkda fronta DNES . 8 October 1997, p. 1.
5
cases, but also the current position of the Netherlands in NATO with the prospective
position of the Czech Republic.
E. WAY FORWARD
The body of this thesis contains three chapters. Chapter Two describes the case of
the Dutch. By examining its main historical events, the aspects of its geo-strategic situation,
and its economic factors, I will narrow down the Dutch determinants to those which
influenced national decision-makers in reorienting the Dutch policy to alignment. Further, I
will describe the Dutch security and defense policy and strategic political culture to identify
the main agents that have contributed to the Netherlands' image in NATO.
In Chapter Three, I will provide a case study of the Czech Republic, focusing on
identical variables. Defining the main characteristics of the Czech security and defense
policy, its determinants, and its limits will be crucial for the analysis in the fourth chapter.
In the fourth, pivotal chapter, I will point out the main correlations, both positive
and negative, between the two case studies, analyze them, define the position of the Czech
Republic in the Alliance, and formulate suggestions and recommendations for Czech
decision-makers to improve this position.
F. JUSTIFICATION
I chose the Dutch case for a number of reasons. Firstly, the Netherlands is a small
state. Several times, Dutch officials have expressed their concern over this exact position in
international relations. Belonging to this category of states usually entails certain limits,
which are identical with those of the Czech Republic.
Second, both countries have had similar experiences in modern European history.
Both states were relatively weak defensively in the period of time just previous to World
War II , and the trauma caused by the German occupation directly effected changes in their
post-war security and defense policies. Notwithstanding that, both countries are German
neighbors and now cooperate closely with Germany, though only within political limits
allowed by the anti-German sentiment of their citizens.
Also, location is important. Both countries occupy strategically important areas
between great powers likely to be struck in any major European conflict. The Dutch ports
supply a great portion of Europe and the Czech Republic lies on the strategical West-East
axis. Their experiences in World War II demonstrate the geo-strategical importance of both
countries.
Finally, similar economic backgrounds allow for the comparison of both cases. Since
the Netherlands had a destroyed economy after World War II, it focused on reconstruction
and economic stability, while the needs of strengthening its defense capability were
neglected. We can see a very similar pattern in post-communist Czechoslovakia. The large
and highly productive industrial base prior to communism was devastated by years of
central planning, and the Czechoslovak and, lately, the Czech government have been
concentrating on making the transformation to a market economy. Thus, military affairs
have received only secondary attention by the government, despite a stronger need for
readiness and national defense capability.
In the following chapter, I will describe the Dutch historical experiences, limits, and
other relevant factors that led the country on its road from military weakness to alignment
in NATO with other western democracies, an alignment in which it established itself as a
reliable ally.
n. CASE STUDY: THE NETHERLANDS
*
According to Domke, "most familiar refrain to observers of Dutch politics, and
especially of Dutch security policy is that Holland is a small country. Size does explain
some of the basic trends and special problems observed in postwar Dutch defense."9
The Netherlands was a founding member of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization
(1949) and it has been seen as a reliable ally continually for the almost 50 years of its NATO
membership. Although some people claim that Dutch society has experienced political
polarization over security and defense issues since the mid-1960's 10 and that subsequently,
"attitudes toward security, defense and NATO issues were shifting significantly," 11 it has
not had any major influence on the Netherlands' s long-term positive image in NATO. On
the contrary, the Netherlands has remained a great supporter ofNATO policy. Regardless
of the the heavy nuclear debate throughout the 1980's, the Netherlands defense policy had
stayed closely tied with NATO's strategy of defense, deterrence, and flexible response until
the end of the Cold War. 12 No fundamental changes have occurred since 1990 with respect
to the newly emerging options in European security architecture. Indeed, the Netherlands
9 William K. Domke, "The Netherlands: Strategy Options and Change," in Evolving
European Defense Policies , ed. Kelleher and Mattox (Toronto: DC. Heath and Company,
1987), p. 273.
10 Richard A. Bitzinger "The Low Countries," in Transition and Turmoil in the Atlantic
Alliance , ed. Robert ALevine (New York: Crane Russak, 1991), p. 199.
11
Ibid., p. 214.
12 Domke, p. 292.
defense reform has followed NATO's "New Strategic Concept," a conformity which has
confirmed its image as a reliable partner.
One might see such reliability as blind unity. However, these policies should be
considered as a decisive willingness to engage in collective defense, 13 intensive
communication in time of crisis, 14 and burden and risk-sharing.
A question arises about the Dutch case: Why is the Netherlands a reliable NATO
member and what contributed to this image? Modern Dutch history, its geo-strategic
situation, and its economic factors significantly determined the strategic decision of the
Netherlands to join the alliance (at first, the Brussels Treaty and later on, NATO). These
basic determinants are then also reflected in the principles of the Dutch security and defense
policy within the Dutch alignment in NATO. Security and defense policy, together with a
developed strategic political culture are the foundations of the Dutch position in the
alliance.
The historical experience of the Dutch people helped confirm the rationale in their
post-war government's decision to solve their security dilemma through a collective defense.
A decline of colonial power, low security guarantees resulting from a policy of neutrality,
invasion, and the occupation by German armies (all bitter facts of either World War II, or
the period before or after) were the factors in Dutch history that influenced their decision to
participate in alliances.
13 The North Atlantic Treaty , (Washington, D.C.,: 1949), Article 5.
14 Thomas Risse-Kappen, Cooperation Among Democracies ( Princeton, New Jersey:
Princeton University Press, 1995), p. 91.
10
The overall limiting aspects of the geo-strategic position of the Netherlands
determined some of the factors that helped form the decision of the Dutch officials to
change their posture of neutrality in its foreign policy to one of defense cooperation among
democracies. The small size and location of the country, sandwiched among three major
powers, at a crossroad of trade lines, were the main limits which determined the strategic
decision.
Certain economic factors also affected the Dutch decisions in national post World
War II security. Holland's poor economy was not helped by its policy of neutrality as the
country was exploited by all hostile sides in both World Wars. Moreover, the costs of
post-war reconstruction, unemployment, inflation and other destabilizing factors were high,
comparable with those of the countries directly involved in World War II. A preference for
stabilizing the post war economy before building armed forces, and a demand for increased
defense capabilities led to the decision to facilitate these goals within an alliance.
Recovering the Dutch post War economy also led to military integration. The
Netherlands based the recovery on using massive economic aid through Marshall Plan, and
on economic integration within region. Dutch economic dependence on a Germany that was
occupied by the victorious powers required that the Dutch cooperate closely with the
supervising powers not only with respect to the economy, but also in military, and foreign
policy.
All these three basic aspects (historical experience, geo-strategic situation, and
economy) affected the strategic decision of the Dutch to participate in a military alliance of
western democracies. Further, the Dutch security and defense policy, which was based on
11
this decision, and the strategic political culture then became the main modulators of the
Dutch position within NATO.
The Dutch security and defense policy was strictly subordinated to NATO
defense-planning and strategic concepts, flexibly adjusting to any announced changes.
When the economic development and domestic political situation allowed, the armed forces
were modernized and defense capability increased. By sharing the alliance's tasks and
cooperating closely with other allies, the Dutch gained respect in the eyes of the other
allies.
Alongside this kind of security and defense policy, the Dutch strategic political
culture played significant role in the Dutch effort to achieve a prominent position within
alliance's structures. Strong political consensus among the Dutch, support among the
citizens for a Dutch security and defense policy tied closely to the Euro-Atlantic defense
concept, and the public concern demonstrated by political elites' about national security
were decisive elements in helping to formulate the strategic political culture which has
tremendously influenced the position of the Netherlands in NATO. Logically starting with
the examination of the most important historical events and processes, let us briefly
summarize what the essential historical points were that prompted the strategic decision to
leave behind a century-old policy of neutrality, and to enter into and firmly integrate within
West European and, later, Euro-Atlantic defense structures.
12
A. DETERMINANTS OF THE STRATEGIC DECISION
1. A Lesson from History
The fate of a country is rightly in the hands of authorities, if they choose to take
their national history into account to ensure a better and safer future for their citizens. It
works both in the case of small states and that of great ones as well. For example, the
course of World War II reoriented the foreign policy of neutrality not only in the
Netherlands but also in the United States. The Netherlands left their policy of neutrality
behind and allied with others. Yet, learning such a lesson from history was a long-term
process. In order to understand this process, it would be worthwhile to study Dutch history
from the Golden Age of the nation (starting in the end of 16th century) to World War II,
(when the Netherlands became a member of Euro Atlantic defense community).
After examining the large epoch ofDutch history, I have found that three aspects
are significant to our study. First is the sharp decline of Dutch colonial power from a great
power of decisive strength on an international scale in 1 8th century, to a small power with a
far less significant position in 20th century.
Secondly, a foreign policy of neutrality is not a rational option for the security
dilemma of any country who is of the Netherlands' parameters. Located among the three
Great Powers at the gate of European trade and possessing a large economic base, the
Netherlands could not carry out a scrupulous foreign policy of neutrality. In response to the
Netherlands' pursuit of an active role in promoting permanent peace and security,the Great
Powers showed little respect to Dutch neutrality and independence.
13
Thirdly, the German invasion in 1940 and the five-year occupation of the country
with all its military, political, social, and moral consequences exposed the bitter weakness of
neutrality.
Finally, the events of the early, post World War II period were the last stones on the
Netherlands' road to military alliance. Fear of a renewed German threat, the emerging Cold
War, and the likely nuclear dimension of any future European conflict galvanized western
democracies into a strong military alliance, which acted as a firm counterweight to the
Eastern Bloc's security system for over 40 years.
a. Decline of Colonial Power
Some scholars simplify the foreign policy history of the Netherlands as one
of a declining power. 15 In fact, a phase that began with decades of military, economic,
political, cultural and intellectual blossom in the 17th century culminated in years of
economic devastation, military defeat, and loss of national sovereignty during the five years
of Nazi occupation in World War II.
Within this long historical period, the Netherlands underwent the transition
from a policy of neutrality to one of tight military and political alignment. One of the most
obvious reasons, of course, is the fact that the Netherlands, originally a great power,
became a small power, incapable of persuasive unilateral acts of force in international
relations.
15
Peter E. Baehr, "The Foreign Policy of the Netherlands," in The Other Powers , ed.
Ronald P. Barston (New York: Barnes&Noble, 1973), p. 62-3.
14
In examining the decline of its power throughout history, it is worthwhile to
divide the period of modern Dutch history into three smaller periods of time: its rise, its
peak and its fall. The glory of the Netherlands as a great power took place in a period called
the "Golden Age." 16
(1) Rise.
During the early Golden Age (1588-1647), the Republic became a
great power. The Netherlands territorially expanded to the North, cleared regions of
Spanish garrisons and gained strategic approaches to the Northern Rhine. Militarily, the
Netherlands underwent army reforms which are still considered a turning point in the
history of soldiering and military organization. The Dutch military reforms of the 1590's
were pivotal, introducing basic changes which were then widely adopted all over Europe. 17
From 1590, there was a dramatic improvements in the Republic's
economic circumstances. Commerce and shipping expanded enormously, as did the towns.
Dutch commercial and financial activities, skills, technology, and engineering came to exert
an immense impact on European culture and perhaps especially in central Europe,
Scandinavia, Spain, and, later, Russia. 18 To protect their commerce, the Dutch expanded
16 Adriaan J. Barnouw, "The Seventeenth Century: The Golden Age," in The Netherlands ,
ed. Robert J. Kerner (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1946), p.
40.
17
Jonathan Israel, The Dutch Republic: Its Rise. Greatness, and Fall 1477-1806 , (New




their navy, until by 1650 it was twice the size of the French and English fleets combined.
19
At the same time , as the Dutch dominance in the "rich trades" commenced, innovations
and achievements in Art and architecture proceeded with intensity, which has no parallel in
any other time, or place, in history.
20
The rise of the mechanistic world - viewed within intellectual life,
brought new inventions in Mathematics, Physics and Astronomy. Together with progress in
the other sciences, long-distance navigation was developed, which made possible a
vigorous, successful and enduring maritime expansion in Asian, African, and American seas.
(2) Greatness.
In the latter half of the Golden Age (1647-1702), the Netherlands
attained world trade primacy and consolidated a vast and profitable colonial empire in the
Western hemisphere as well as another in the Eastern. 21 With the possession ofNorthern
Brazil, the Dutch totally dominated the European sugar market. The Netherlands was by far
the strongest European power in Africa, and dominated the transatlantic slave trade. The
Dutch were in full control along the Guinea cost, and also conquered Angola from the
Portuguese. By 1648 all six of the modern Dutch Antilles - the three "Curacao" islands -
Curacao, Aruba, and Bonaire - and the more northerly "Leeward" group - St. Eustatius,
19
"Netherlands," The World Factbook (Washington, DC: Central Intelligence Agency,
1995), p. 300.




Saba, and half of St. Martin - were under the Dutch flag. Finally, there was "New
Netherland" (Nova Belgica), from where the Dutch controlled the North American fur trade
from its two bases at Manhattan (New Amsterdam) and Fort Orange, which is today
Albany. In the East Indies, the Dutch were solidly entrenched in the Indian subcontinent,
Ceylon, Malaya peninsula and Indonesia (and until 1662, Taiwan). 22 But this imposing
empire on both sides of the South Atlantic collapsed.
(3) Decline.
The age of military, economic, political and cultural decline
( 1 702- 1 806), caused by frequent fights with other conquest powers over the colonies,
revolutions and counterrevolutions, coups d' etat, and finally the French occupation
resulted in the long-term decline of Dutch colonial power until the first half of the 20th
century.
The year 1702 was a key division in the history of the Netherlands
because of the onset of the War of the Spanish Succession (1702-13), the last great
European conflict in which the Netherlands participated as a major power. After the War of
Spanish Succession (Peace of Utrecht 1713), the Netherlands started to conduct policy of
neutrality.
23 The Dutch army fell from 130,000 to 40,000 troops by 1715. 24 Military
22 Ibid, p. 934.
3 Ibid.
, p. 960.
1A Ibid., pp. 985-6.
17
expenditure was cut drastically, and with a weakening military followed the collapse of
Dutch world trade primacy in the decades 1 720-40. 25
The economic decline of society was followed by the decline of the
universities and the decline in visual arts. In addition, society was destabilized by the Second
Orangist Revolution (1747-1751), the Patriot Revolution (1780- 1787), the Fourth
Anglo-Dutch War (1784), and the Orangist Counter-revolution (1787-1795).
The crushing of the Dutch navy by the British at the battle of Camper
Down on October 1797, definitively marked the end of Dutch naval power as a significant
force in global politics.
26 Loss of navy power was accompanied by losses of overseas
territories. The British empire permanently absorbed Ceylon, and the Dutch enclaves in
South India, South Africa, and Jawa. Surinam, west Guyana, and Curacao were
temporarily captured. The decline of colonial power lasted in broad sense until 1949, when
the Netherlands recognized Indonesia as an independent nation.
Napoleon had achieved absolute power in France and extended his
control over the Netherlands. At his direction, General Augerean on September 14, 1801
sponsored a final coup d' etat which strengthened executive authority in the Netherlands.
Napoleon's wars had ruined the trade which had been the main source ofDutch





27 Hendrik N. Boon, "Decline and Reawakening" in The Netherlands ed. Robert J. Kerner
(Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1946), p. 66.
18
from great-power politics. 28 The Dutch found in a policy of neutrality a tool of ensuring
peace for a small state.
In 1997, the Dutch queen remains sovereign of the Netherlands
Antilles, Surinam, and Aruba, which became autonomous in internal affairs in 1954, 1975,
and 1986, respectively.
b. Precarious Neutrality
Since the beginning of 1 8th century the Netherlands veered toward a policy
of neutrality. In fact, Dutch neutrality ensured only fragile peace during the period until
World War II. There were two main reasons for this non-persuasive Dutch neutrality in
foreign policy. First, The Netherlands, with its traditional enthusiasm for the force of
international law, extended commerce and perpetuated its interests from the times of its
glory and, overestimating the scope of a small power, did not permit itself to be reduced to
any degree of isolationism. Second, the high level of the concern of the Great Powers' in
Dutch affairs generated a lack of respect for its neutrality.
The neutrality policy of the late 18 th century was in reality a pro-French
policy and ended in French domination. 29 In spite of its firm national resolve not to
participate in international politics, the Netherlands suddenly found itself in the center of
world politics with the "Luxembourg Affair." The nation was shocked to learn that the
28 Amry Vandenbosch, Dutch Foreign Policy since 1815: A Study in Small Power Politics




actions of its queen and of its foreign minister had nearly precipitated a general war in
Western Europe. Napoleon III, envious and afraid of the expansion of Prussia as the result
of the Austro-Prussian war in 1866, demanded compensation for France. He approached
King William III as Grand Duke of Luxembourg, for the cession of Luxembourg to France
in exchange for a monetary indemnity. Though small, the country would have been of
considerable strategic value to France. King William and his foreign minister had obtained
the approval of Bismarck for the deal, but when the plan became known in Germany, a
national outburst of German sentiment for war followed. Great Britain then called a
conference of the Great Powers, in which the demilitarization and neutralization of
Luxembourg was agreed upon as the solution to the problem. 30
Later on, Dutch neutrality was challenged in the Boer War. Tension became
acute when it became known that the Boer republics had not been invited to the first Hague
Peace Conference in 1899. The Dutch government found itself in a very embarrassing
position, for if it had extended an invitation to the Boer republics to send representatives to
the conference the British government would not have participated in the conference. 31
The adherence of the Netherlands to the North Sea Declaration in 1908 led
to a series of events which were extremely disturbing to a small state determined to keep
out of the main current of world politics. Some officials of the Dutch government saw in the
declaration a departure from the traditional policy of strict neutrality. The reason the affair






plans for strengthening its coastal defenses. It was assumed that the plans were the result of
German pressure. It was contended that the purpose of the plans was to prevent a British
fleet from going up the river to the aid of Antwerp should the Germans invade Belgium. 32
There is a question as to what extent the Dutch policy of neutrality and
independence kept the country out of World War I hostilities. The Netherlands was able to
stay out of the war for the reason that the Central Powers and the Allies both thought it was
in their best interest not to force Holland into war. Germany wished to keep Holland open
as a channel through which to receive urgently needed imports from abroad, and Great
Britain had no desire to see Germany occupy the Dutch coastline and be free to use Dutch
ports and Antwerp as submarine bases. 33 Despite this basic attitude of Germany and Britain,
the Netherlands' policy of neutrality did not manage to save the country from the
devastating consequences of World War I.
When World War I broke out, Holland found itself unprepared and startled.
It had developed a firm belief in international agreements and had not considered European
tension too seriously. Nevertheless, measures were taken to protect its borders: the 200,000
men whom the country could bring under arms were immediately mobilized and
supplemented by the Landstorm, until about 450,000 men were in the field. 34 For four years
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invasion, a danger which fortunately never materialized. Holland suffered severe privations
in the war, and its losses from the unrestricted submarine warfare of the Germans were
considerable. Nevertheless, Dutch neutrality continued to be respected by both warring
powers, because England was not eager to have Germany on the Dutch coastline and
Germany, in turn, did not seen any advantage in lengthening its front. World War I brought
to the Dutch a taste of the world to come - government control over economic activities,
large-scale unemployment, and increasing political differentiations. 35
Providing an asylum for the deposed German emperor in 1918 was preceded
by a peculiar incident, not in accordance with the neutral policy of the Netherlands. The
Adjutant General to Queen Wilhelmina invited Emperor William II to take refuge in the
Netherlands. This act was seen by the Powers as a commitment to international politics. 36
The Netherlands' Government entered the League of Nations without
hesitation in 1919. Since the preparation of the negotiations started during the War, some
Dutch saw in League membership a departure from their traditional policy of neutrality and
independence. 37
The historical events described above show that neutrality was not a rational
option for Dutch security and defense. The Netherlands had really been tightly involved in
international relations because of its concerns for its overseas territories, its high level of
international commerce, its physical location among powers, and its strong trust in the
35
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power of international law. This Dutch commitment, together with the little respect the
Powers gave to Dutch neutrality, taking advantage of them whenever it suited their
purposes, reduced the probability of Dutch neutrality.
c. Consequences ofthe World War II
The course of World War II and its consequences for the Dutch state and
society was the main catalyst that moved the Dutch along the road from neutrality to
collective defense. The Dutch policy of neutrality in the beginning of World War II was a
continuation of its policy in World War I, and all of the old problems again presented
themselves. World War I had left neutral states sadly impaired and chaotic; the plight of
neutrals in the World War II became no better. There were violations of Dutch neutrality
by belligerent ships and aircrafts; several Dutch planes were fired on above Netherlands
territory; a number of Dutch ships were sunk by German submarines and magnetic mines;
German seaplanes fired machine guns and dropped bombs on Dutch fishing boats in the
North Sea. Dutch ships on their way to Holland were taken to British control bases for





( 1 ) Pre war period.
After the collapse of the policy of collective security in the
mid-1930's, Dutch foreign policy was still designed to maintain neutrality, just as it had
served the Netherlands during the World war I.
Although official relations between the Netherlands and Germany
had been good, and the German Foreign Office repeatedly assured the Netherlands
government that the Reich would respect Dutch neutrality, the Dutch policy was not seen
entirely as impartial when international tension began to increase after the German
occupation of the Rhineland in 1936. Germany, after the outbreak of the war, sought by a
press campaign to frighten the Netherlands into breaking with the League. The German
press declared that neutrals attending League meetings were guilty of unneutral acts,
because the League had become an "Anglo-French" organ. 39
The Dutch hoped that the miracle could happen again. Developments
in warfare and the ideological character of the gigantic struggle, however, made it extremely
unlikely. After the German reoccupation of the Rhineland, the Dutch saw little else that they
could do. It was too late to adopt another policy. After that date, any move in the direction
of a political or military alliance with France and Great Britain would have been the signal
for a speedy invasion of their country. Nor did the Dutch feel that an alliance would add






On August 28, 1939 the Dutch government ordered the mobilization
of the armed forces in anticipation of the outbreak of war. Immediately after the invasion of
Poland on September 1, the Dutch government issued a declaration announcing the
intention of the Netherlands to stay out of the European conflict. The mobilization was
maintained until invasion. 41
(2) Invasion.
On May 10, 1940, at three o'clock in the morning, German troops
started to cross the border. German planes bombed Dutch airfields and dropped parachute
troops near strategic locations a few days later. Queen Wilhelmina and the royal family went
to England on a British destroyer.
By Tuesday, May 14, the military situation became manifestly
hopeless. Rotterdam was heavily bombed. The center of the city, including one-eighth of its
total area was destroyed. Approximately 900 persons were killed and 78,500 were made
homeless. Rotterdam, along with Warsaw and Coventry, became a wartime symbol of Nazi
ruthlessness. On the following morning the capitulation was signed. 42
41 Werner Warmbrunn, The Dutch under German Occupation 1940-1945 . (Stanford,





The people of Holland entered five years of occupation after a
five-day war. Hitler planned to tie the Netherlands to Germany as closely as was politically
feasible after a German victory. Although Dutch casualties in manpower had not been
heavy, the economic, military, social and moral consequences were high in World War II.
Hitler established a civilian administration staffed by Germans for the
occupied territory. The Dutch National Socialist Movement (N.S.B.) was given a free hand
in the staging of public demonstrations and the dissemination of propaganda. Political
Parties were dissolved and Dutch National Socialists were placed in administrative
positions. The Jewish population was segregated, concentrated, and later deported to
Poland. The German administration attempted to secure labor for the Reich through a series
of special actions, including recruitment of certain age groups to be deployed in Germany as
manpower in the branchs of commerce, industry, and agriculture.
When the Allied armies liberated Belgium during the first days of
September 1944, the German administration increased its hostility in the occupied
territories. Dutch men of military age were drafted or arrested primarily for fear they might
assist the Allied forces. No longer did the Germans attempt to use Dutch factories and other
productive facilities, but they transported as much machinery and equipment as possible to
Germany. 43 The raw materials and foodstuffs, which the Dutch government had stockpiled






The approaching armies of the Western Allies relieved the
Netherlands. On May 5, 1944, the surrender of German troops in Holland went into effect
at eight o'clock in the morning. Holland was free at last after five years of enemy
occupation.
A weak system of collective security, an ineffective policy of
neutrality during increasing European tension in the 1930's, and the consequences of World
War II on the Dutch nation (i.e., military defeat, overall economic exploitation, and social
and moral devastation) led to a rejection of this policy of neutrality by the government in
exile. This change of attitude was indicated on radio broadcasts by Foreign Minister van
Kleffens from London on November 25, 1942. He declared to his compatriots that the old
times were not coming back, that the old policy of no political agreements with any state or
group of states could not be resumed. Although this decision was made during the War,
closer military collaboration with other countries continued to be carried out afterward.
d Post- World War II Disorder
The situation in Europe after World War II, a fear of a growing German
threat, a weak system of collective defense with increasing tension between powers, and an
emerging Soviet threat all directly influenced decision-making of the Dutch post-war
government regarding national security. This process of readjusting Dutch foreign policy
resulted in the firm integration of the Netherlands into Western European structures.
However, the road from aloofness to collective defense was an indirect one.
27
In the immediate postwar years, the Netherlands relied upon the general
collective security system of the United Nations. This security policy was based on
international cooperation between Western powers and the Soviet Union.
45 However, the
outbreak of the Cold War in 1946 and increasing disagreement among the Great Powers did
not allow for this policy any longer.
(1) German threat.
The government also attached great importance to finding an
international solution for the German question. In December 1946, foreign minister Van
Boetzelaer said: "Preventing] renewed German aggression is our primary aim and in the
interest of us all."46 The Netherlands wanted to make it impossible for Germany to threaten
her security again, and decided to influence the German issue through the Brussels Treaty
Organization. 47 In 1948, governments of five European countries: Britain, France, Belgium,
the Netherlands and Luxembourg signed Brussels Treaty, establishing a military alliance.
Similarly to the Dunkirk Treaty of 1947, signed by France and Britain, the Brussels Treaty
was directed against Germany. 48 In protest of signing the pact, the Soviet Union blocked
45
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West Berlin in 1948. "The Soviet Union rather than Germany soon came to be recognized
as the greater threat."49
(2) Soviet Threat.
This threat had at least two dimensions - a military and an ideological
one. The fear of the Soviet threat resulted from the sheer weight of the Soviet military. The
USSR could mobilize about 150 to 175 divisions (more than 25 of which were elite troops
stationed in the eastern part of Germany) against a paltry 14 divisions stationed in Western
Europe, two of which were American. The balance of air forces was also disadvantageous
to the West: 6,000 Soviet aircraft as opposed to 1,000 aircraft in Western Europe. The US
nuclear monopoly in the early postwar period could not counterbalance the Soviet Union's
conventional military power. "Even the small number ofbombs in the US arsenal meant that
America's nuclear deterrent remained a hollow threat during the years that the United
States alone had the bomb. And it is likely that the Russians, through espionage, knew well
the emptiness of that threat." 50 Moreover, time was passing and the USA soon lost its
nuclear monopoly. In August 1949, the Soviet Union exploded its first atomic device.
The ideological dimension of the Soviet threat had two aspects. First
was a traditionally deep-rooted sense of democracy among the Dutch. As far back as the
days of the Dutch Republic, the Netherlands presented an early model of a democratically
ruled nation. It was not a modern democracy, but the men in power were enlightened




autocrats who wisely granted freedom of speech and freedom of religion, and encouraged
the founding of private institutions that gave destitute and underprivileged citizens freedom
from fear. Suppression of liberating thought was never a part of their policy. Thus, the
notion of the Soviet "People's Democracy" was totally unacceptable to the Netherlands.
Second, the democratic world feared the spread of communism to
the West. Soviet support of subversive activity on the part of communist parties in Western
Europe was what the cabinet feared most. 51 In 1947 the Cominform was created,
communist-inspired strikes broke out in France and Italy, and Moscow gained control over
several East European countries while exerting pressure in Turkey, Greece and various
parts of Asia. 52 These fears of communism along with the strong Soviet military presence in
Europe generated the notion of a significant Soviet threat in Dutch politics.
Both sharing bitter experiences with German expansion, Europe and the
Netherlands (as a part of Europe) focused on setting a world order in the post World War
II era, such that would eliminate any renewed German threat. This was accomplished by
establishing the Brussels Treaty organization. Soon afterward, the emerging Soviet threat
soon received priority in the security decision-making process of western democracies.
They founded the North Atlantic Treaty Organization in 1949 as a political and military
defense coalition to counterbalance the Soviet military weight and to contain communism.
These two basic facts of post World War II Europe, along with the particular






They, in response to a mosaic of experiences from national history, started the process of
adjusting the Dutch foreign policy away from neutrality. This process led to a climax in
1949, when the Netherlands became member ofNATO.
2. Geo-strategic Situation
Dr. Ronald P. Barston has underlined the importance of the following variable for a
small state's security. "The freedom of maneuver of a small state may be restricted by its
strategic location." 53 This situation fully applies to the Dutch case. The factors that are
included in a description of the Dutch geo-strategic situation actually determine some of the
decision-making constraints for the Dutch policy makers. The following is a brief
description of the main aspects of such a situation that illustrate this argument best.
The Netherlands is a small country with geographic position at the crossroads of
Western Europe. 54 Its location among three Great Powers - Britain, France, Prussia, and
later on Germany - has influenced the Dutch security situation throughout modern history.
The Netherlands is a compact country of the size slightly less than twice the size ofNew
Jersey (33,936 sq. km. or 13,103 sq. mil.). It lies in the lowland of northern Europe. The
country is justly called a low country, for half of its territory lies below the high-water levels
of its many rivers and of the bordering North Sea. Close to 60% of the population live in
dikes - protected areas.
53 Ronald P. Barston, The Other Powers . (New York: Barnes&Noble, 1973) p. 20.
54 Vandenbosch, p. 2.
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The Netherlands, with ports ranking third in the World in terms of cargo handled, is
called the gateway for Western Europe's trade with the world. The Netherlands is the
world's third-ranking producer of natural gas and has the sixth-richest reserves. 55 Most of
these data have changed only slightly with time.
The main elements of the Dutch geo-strategic situation are its location along major
European sea lines, its location among larger European neighbors, its role as a strategic
entry and exit point in military campaigns, its natural geographic vulnerability, and its
natural resources.
First, the location of the country on the sea lines, rivers and land roads of Western
Europe significantly influenced Dutch security. The Netherlands controlled goods shipments
to all three Great Powers with vital importance for Germany. The Netherlands, as the
territorial sovereign over the Rhine, was used as a transit country for the trade of the
Rhineland and that of northeastern France to the rest of the world. 56
Great Britain and the United States, aware of the strategic importance of the
Netherlands against Germany in World War I, imposed an economic embargo on the neutral
Netherlands and blocked eighty-six Dutch vessels laden with foodstuffs and cereals in
British and American ports at the end of 1917. In 1939 Rotterdam's total shipping tonnage
was 57 million tons, of which nearly 23 millions tons was transit trught to and from
Germany. This caused severe hunger among the relatively large Dutch population because
"Netherlands," The World Factbook (Washington, DC: Central Intelligence Agency,
1995), p. 300.
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of a lack of foodstuffs. To avoid the mistake made in World War I when Germany did not
have control over shipping of supplies to the Rhineland, Germany invaded the Netherlands
in 1940 and set up a German administration over the Dutch territory.
The location of a country among larger competitive powers is another important
factor for a small state. This handicap helped shape Dutch security in two ways. First, the
Netherlands has historically been considered a state capable of contributing to equilibrium
among the powers of France, Britain, Prussia, and later on Germany. This balancing role of
Netherlands was formally confirmed by the Congress of Vienna57 in 1815, when the
Netherlands was united with Belgium to create a buffer state. 58
The third strategic aspect resulting from the location of the Netherlands at the
crossroads of western Europe has been the function of the Netherlands as a strategic access
and/or departure point in war campaigns among powers. Napoleon annexed the Netherlands
in 1806 as part of his strategic move to the east, the same year, he defeated Prussian and
Russian forces at Friedland, near Konigsberg in eastern Prussia.
Great Britain, on the other hand, has not really had continental ambitions in recent
history; however, it has tried to use the Netherlands in its drive for maintaining a naval
advantage in war. Indeed, it was Britain who pursued the creation of a buffer state at the
mouth of the Rhine in order to restrict any direct approach to the channel by the Germans.
This fear was justified, since the Netherlands played an important role in German military
57
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plans. The plans of von Schlieffen, General Chief of Staff of the German army 1899 to
1906, called for marching throughout Holland on two fronts in case of war. General von
Moltke, successor to von Schlieffen and Chief of Staff at the outbreak of World War I,
changed the plan in 1909 by eliminating from it the march through Holland. 59 Nevertheless,
Hitler successfully returned to von Schlieffen' s plans in 1940, when he annexed the
Netherlands in a five-day Blitzkrieg. Thus, both Great Britain and Germany have held the
position of the Netherlands in high strategic regard.
The flat lowlands of the country are yet another aspect that affects geo-strategic
situation of the Netherlands. The fact that 60% of the population lives on territory below
sea level sharply increases the country's vulnerability in case of an armed conflict.
In fact, the Netherlands came to understand this all too clearly in World War II. In
the final days of the war, the Germans flooded an area of fertile land in the province of
Noord-Holland, which is located below sea level and had been reclaimed from the sea since
World War I. The inundations covered approximately eight percent of the total agricultural
acreage of the Netherlands. About one-third of the inundated soil was covered with sea
water. Where sea water was allowed to flood the land, effective reclamation of the soil was
bound to take a great deal of time. 60
Lastly, the strategic resources of natural gas are a further factor resulting from the
location of the Netherlands. The great importance of this aspect was expressed by Richard
E Bissell, research fellow at the American University's School of International Service,
59
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when he pointed out that "resources as a cause of conflict predate human society." 61 Since
the Slochteren gas field near Groningen (among the largest active fields in the World) was
brought into production in 1959, this factor could not have been relevant in the early
postwar security policy of the Dutch. Its relevance, however, increased later on in the
forming of the Dutch security and defense policy during the Cold War era.
The geo-strategic situation of a small state is a very important aspect of its security.
The Netherlands endures a number of disadvantages from this point of view. The
Netherlands is located at the crossroads of Western Europe, connecting the Great powers
and controlling their supplies. Furthermore, the location of the country among France,
Britain, Prussia and, later on, Germany was a determining factor in Dutch security, as Dutch
territory has served as an equilibrium point for balancing powers and as a strategic access
point in war campaigns among the Powers. Also, the low and flat terrain of the Netherlands,
sharply increases the general vulnerability of the Netherlands. These factors of the Dutch
geo-strategic situation helped influence the reorientation of the Dutch policy from neutrality
to alignment.
61 Richard E. Bissell, "The Resource Dimension of International Conflict" in Managing
GlobalChaos , ed. Chester A. Crocker, Fen Osier Hampson and Pamela All (Washington, DC:
United States Institute of Peace, 1996), p. 141.
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3. Economic Factors
The question of economic development often takes priority in the foreign policy
ofsmall states. 62 These states usually do not have sufficient resources which would allow
them to face any economic sanctions imposed by the Great Powers in the case of a
diametrically different foreign policy on the part of the smaller state. Thus, for a small state
to develop its economic, security, and defense policies under an economic and security
umbrella of the Great Powers would be fruitful.
The Netherlands learned just such a lesson: that economic objectives are met only
within a dependable security system. By not respecting this basic knowledge, by
underestimating the need of a dependable security system, and by adjusting its foreign
policy to changes too slowly, the Dutch were left prone to a violent interruption of its
economic plans by an aggressor. Subsequently, foreign rule exploited the Dutch economy.
The need to recover economically and increase defense capability, while an external threat
was growing, led to a reorientation the Dutch foreign policy after World War II. Eventually,
disharmony between the economic policy and the security system, economic exploitation of
the country during the period of dependence, and a plan for economic recovery led the
Dutch post World War II government to join a military alliance with the other western
democracies.
62
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36
(L Economic Policy vs. The Security System
The building of Dutch economic prosperity was interrupted by the German
invasion. The invasion, in turn, was a direct consequence of discord between Dutch
economic policies and the Dutch security system.
The Dutch economy had been traditionally based on foreign trade and
commerce, but had declined in power over the course of World War I. Gradually however,
the Netherlands began to regain its former prosperity, and in 1928 per capita international
trade, excluding transit shipments, amounted to $244, exceeding that of all other countries.
Belgium could muster only $218, England $215, and the United States $78 per capita. 63
As a result of this growing trade, the merchant marine expanded rapidly. By
1929, it ranked eighth among the world's merchant marines, exceeded only by England, the
United States, Japan, Germany, France, Italy, and Norway. 64 The Netherlands imported
from its colonies tea, sugar, tobacco, spice, tin, bauxite, copper, and rubber, and then
reexported these products down the European continent. Also, a very large percentage of
its manufacturing industry operated principally for export. The percentage of industrial
products in total exports of the country had reached 60% before the war. 65 A crucial part
of this export and reexport went to Germany. In the five years preceding World War II,
between 14 and 20 percent of all Dutch exports went to Germany.






The Netherlands imported goods from Germany as well. In the same period,
between a fourth and a fifth of all Dutch imports (in value) came from Germany. At their
peak, nearly a third of all Dutch imports came from Germany in 193 1, and in 1934 a fourth
of Netherlands exports went to Germany. Aside from this earlier level of mutual commerce,
one half of Rotterdam's total shipping tonnage in 1939 was transit to and from Germany. 66
Such a close economic cooperation with Germany, however, excluded the possibility of
remaining neutral in the case of a conflict between powers.
Despite the fact that Dutch trade with the United Kingdom was almost as
large, there was no reason to hope that the World War I miracle, when the Netherlands was
spared direct military attack, could be repeated. In World War II, Germany was very
concerned with the strategic importance of Holland. Britain has rarely had any reason to
expand into the continent. Thus, any potential threat in the case of a conflict among the
Powers could only really come from Germany, as the strategic importance of the
Netherlands was not equally important to both powers On one hand, if Britain had annexed
the Netherlands, the next step would have been Germany. On the other hand, by occupying
Holland, Germany would have controlled the channel. The British trust in their strength as
an isolated island and their consequent lower concern for Dutch neutrality could not
counterbalance Germany's concern for ensuring a fluent supply to the Rhineland through the
Dutch ports. The Netherlands did not learn its lesson from World War I in that regard.
Insisting on a policy of neutrality, the Netherlands did not ensure sufficient security for its
economic policy.
66 Vandenbosch, p. 275.
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b. Economic exploitation
The Dutch under the German occupation of 1940-1945 is a classical example
of" [h]ow the territory of the small state can be used - exploited - by another great power
in the execution of sinister designs." 67
The state of war existing between Germany and the Allies imposed a heavy
economic burden on the Netherlands, quite apart from the expenses of mobilization. Transit
trade with Germany practically ceased as a result of the British blockade in 1940. War
conditions made it more difficult to secure raw materials for the Dutch industry. Dutch
ships were sunk by mines in the English Channel and elsewhere. As a result of these
conditions, the total volume of industrial and commercial activity decreased. Furthermore,
unemployment rose despite the fact that approximately 300,000 men were mobilized. 68
After the occupation began, Hitler established a German supervisory civilian
administration for the occupied territory. Although the total quantity of industrial
production dropped throughout the occupation until in 1944 it was less than half that of
1939, the value of exports to Germany doubled in 1940 over the level of 1938, and more
than tripled over 1938 for the four subsequent war years. This was mainly due to wholesale
removal of supplies and requisitioned clothing, bicycles, furniture, etc.
After September 1944 most factories ceased operations for lack of fuel and
transportation. It has been estimated that, in January 1945, the level of production was only
67 Olaf V. Knudsen, "Analysing Small-State Security: The Role of External Factors," in Small
States and the Security Challenge in the New Europe , ed. Werner Bauwens, et. al. ( London
and Washington, DC: Brassey's, 1996), p. 10.
68 Warmbrunn, p. 5.
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25 percent that of 1938. Moreover, since the German war machine needed more and more
manpower, the Germans also drafted labor from the Netherlands. By the end of the war,
between 300,000 and 400,000 Dutchmen were at work in the German Reich, exclusive of
prisoners of war and the imprisoned Jews.
Before the end of the War, Hitler ordered a "scorched earth" policy
involving either the removal to Germany or the outright destruction of industries and
transportation facilities which might be of use to the Allies. Some of the worst demolitions
took place in the harbor of Rotterdam, where approximately 40 percent of the total pier
area and warehouse space was destroyed.
After the invasion at Normandy, and the Germans destroyed the dikes and
flooded the land, the soil was inundated. The circulation of paper money increased almost
fourfold from April, 1941 to May 1, 1945. Taxation of annual income almost doubled from
1940 to 1944. By Werner Warmbrunn, 1944 the average cost of living had risen by
approximately 50% over the base year 1938-39. The cost of food rose by about 60% during
the same period, while wages were frozen in 1940. 69 Such heavy exploitation of the Dutch
economy as a direct consequence of a weak security system had a pivotal influence on the






The Dutch plan for economic recovery suggested that the Dutch, post World
War II government join a military alliance with the other western democracies for at least
three reasons. First, the Dutch cabinet was convinced that priority should be given to the
reconstruction of the financial and economic stability of the country. Military readiness
could be postponed until a later date. 70 Thus, a military coalition with other democracies
was an easy way to increase defense capability without spending additional money. 71
Second, the Netherlands put effort into the creation of regional institutions
for economic cooperation, and it attached great value to the successful development of the
Benelux customs union, established in 1944. 72 To avoid the mistakes of the prewar period -
an inharmonious economic policy and security system - the Netherlands covered the
economic union by one security umbrella. Hence, joining a Brussels Treaty seemed to be a
highly rationale step.
Finally, the US Congress approved a European Recovery Program, known
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the containment of communism. 74 Participating in the Marshall Plan thus offered a double
benefit to the strongly anticommunist cabinet of the Netherlands.
75
However, considering the acceptance of the Marshall plan involved a cost
and benefit analysis, since the US administration was not hesitating to use the Marshall Plan,
at the same time, as a useful tool in its "carrot and stick" policy. The Americans pressed for
a Dutch retreat from Indonesia and insisted that Indonesian republics be granted their
independence. They threatened to cut off not only military assistance to the Netherlands,
but also that part of the Marshall Plan aid which was meant for Indonesia. 76
Economic factors also played an important role in Dutch postwar decision-
making. Discord between the economic policy and security system, the economic
exploitation of the country during the German occupation, and the plan for an economic
recovery were the factors which influenced this process the most.
B. POSITION-BUILDING MODULATORS
The security and defense policy of a specific state and its strategic political culture
are the main agents that form a state's reputation in the eyes of its allies. By attaining a
good position within a military coalition as a result of such a good reputation, a small state
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increases its chances to survive in times of crisis. Moreover, an applied national security and
defense policy can persuade armed partners to respect a small state's position in the
Alliance.
1. Security and Defense Policy
The implementation of a small state's security and defense policy in peacetime
requires the confluence of a broad, complex number of opinions, and practical provisions.
In order to simplify this complexity, it is useful to define a few crucial points. The main
factors serving to determine the security and defense policy of a sovereign member are its
level of policy coordination with the strategic concepts of the alliance; the level and
structure of the mutual defense cooperation among the coalition partners; the state's share
of the risk in times of collective defense or other missions; and its share of the burden in the
effort to build credible defense capabilities for the coalition. The Dutch security and defense
policy is an example of a rational approach to this position-building process.
a. Policy Coordination
For the healthy working of a military alliance, it is important for the alliance's
members to reach very close agreement on one strategic concept and to adjust their
respective national defense policies as close to this concept as possible. On one hand,
deviant defense policy alternatives are not helpful but harmful, particularly to the security of
a small state. On other hand, small states are afraid of losing their sovereignty. However,
the small state, though reluctant to conform to coalition policy in peacetime, is not strong
43
enough in times of crisis to face an aggressor's power unilaterally on its own, especially in
the nuclear age. The Netherlands, aware of these constraints on a small state, subordinated
its policy fully to NATO's strategic concept of deterrence and flexible response77 :
Throughout the first 20 years or so ofNATO's existence, the
Netherlands almost totally subordinated national goals to NATO and U.S.
security policies. In fact, it was even argued that 'national interest [was] not
a concept of much relevance to Dutch foreign policy,' 78 and that Dutch
security policy was, for all practical purposes, virtually nonexistent.
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The Dutch defense policy was tightly bound to NATO not only in the Cold
War era, but also during detente. While disarmament negotiations among superpowers
reduced the quantity of armaments on the European continent, NATO continued developing
the quality of its defense systems as a continuation of its "dual-track' policy.
80 During the
1984-1993 planning period, each of the Dutch armed services was supposed to complete
modernization programs, thus giving the Netherlands the most modern armed forces in
NATO. 81 After the end of the Cold War, without regard to the emerging options within a
prospectively new European security system, the Netherlands continued to conduct policy
11 Lawrence S. Kaplan, NATO and the United States (New York: Twayne Publishers, 1994),
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in accordance with NATO's strategic concept agreed to at the North Atlantic Council's
Roma summit of 1991.
"
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The January, 1993 issue ofDutch Defense Priorities Review spells out the
new defense policy: the Netherlands has built new armed forces which can be deployed
immediately in peacetime and in crisis situations, and can operate more effectively. 83
Promoting such a tight policy relative to NATO's strategic concepts contributed to
Holland's "place in the sun" within the Alliances' s structures.
b. Defense Cooperation
Promoting mutual cooperation occupies a place of importance in terms of
confidence-building measures among allies. The Dutch government has contributed in this
regard since the very beginning of its alignment. The Netherlands and Belgium focused on
communications between headquarters, common armaments production and procurement,
the sharing of training camps and artillery ranges, the furnishing of Dutch troops to Belgian
maneuvers (and vice-versa), closer cooperation between Dutch and Belgian military
schools, and exchanges of officer trainees. 84 Later on, this cooperation was extended to
other allies. Nevertheless, the Benelux regional scope is a cornstone ofDutch-NATO
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cooperation. In the second half of the 1980's, about one-third of Dutch pilot trainees were
trained in Belgium.
In addition, the Netherlands participated in production and co-production of
F-16 and Leopard tanks and other projects. 85 However, the ratification of the EC's
Maastricht Treaty on economic and political union did not generate a strong sentiment for
European defense policy in the Netherlands. The Netherlands participates neither in the
Eurocorps, inaugurated by France and Germany in 1992 (unlike Luxembourg and Belgium),
nor in EUROMARFOR, the European Maritime Force (unlike Portugal). 86 Instead, on
March 30, 1994, the Netherlands signed an agreement with Germany providing for the
creation of a 30,000-strong Dutch-German joint force that would be fully integrated into
NATO and open to other NATO members.
Moreover, the Netherlands promotes cooperation among Central and East
European countries within the "Partnership for Peace" program, 87 and helps to generate an
increasing level of military cooperation, transparency and interoperability between NATO
and Partner forces. 88 The broad scope of Dutch collaboration within the Alliance is an
example of how much a small state can contribute in that regard.
85 Domke, p. 290.
86 Charles L. Barry, "Creating a European Security and Defense Identity," Joint Forces
Quarterly, Spring 1997.
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c. Risks Sharing
Commitment to collective defense and the expansion of that to the level of
collective security also brings with it certain kinds of risks that had been diminished under
the policy of neutrality. A small state in the Alliance is expected to share, for example, in
tasks resulting from nuclear deterrence policies, or in tasks resulting from troop deployment
in areas outside ofNATO.
Indeed, the Netherlands is experienced in both tasks. As far as strategy of
nuclear deterrence, the Netherlands was willing to share risks:
The Dutch government has a record of active participation in alliance
policy making and, more importantly, of loyal fulfilment of alliance
responsibilities to the best of its abilities. This has meant a commitment to
the alliance strategy of flexible response, in which Dutch forces are deployed
in the forward areas of Germany and, the recent decision to the contrary
[sic], assigned their share of six nuclear tasks. 89
In addition to this highly positive Dutch attitude toward NATO's nuclear
policy, it must be mentioned that the Netherlands' commitments were never stretched. It is
true that the debate on the deployment of intermediate-range nuclear forces (INF) (in the
form of forty-eight U.S. cruise missiles) in the Netherlands pushed the Dutch commitment
to NATO policy to its upper limits. Indeed, according to Professor William K. Domke,
"[t]he Dutch government committed itself to the December 1979 NATO INF decision, but
it took until November 1985 before it decided to deploy the missiles."90 Moreover, as
events and crises outside Europe throughout the 1970's raised issues of military operations




and contingency planning for areas beyond NATO's command theaters, the Netherlands,
together with several other European states, insisted on the contingency that NATO's
"out-of-area" must be dealt with on a case-by-case basis. 91 However, this objection did not
serve as an obstacle to the Netherlands in its committment to deploy 105 soldiers in the
Multinational Fore and Observers (MFO) on the Sinai Peninsula in April, 1982.
Another example comes from September, 1984. At the time, two Dutch
Alkmaar-class minesweepers arrived in the Red Sea and searched six weeks for anti-ship
mines used in the Iran-Iraq conflict. In this case, the operation in the out-of-NATO-area
was considered an important defensive measure to remove dangers to international
shipping. 92 Later on, the Netherlands made a naval contribution to the US-led UN
coalition in GulfWar of 1991, and to the 1996 NATO-led peace force (SFOR) in
Bosnia-Herzegovina. The Netherlands contributed to SFOR with approximately 1,500
troops.
d. Burden Sharing
Burden-sharing is one of the major limits a small state faces in a large
coalition due to its more or less limited GDP. Thanks to a relatively healthy economy, the
Netherlands is now a solvent contributor to NATO's programs. However, attaining this
status was not automatic, as the early Dutch alignment required a consumption of security






In the years 1948-1950 in fact, the Dutch lacked even a single standing
division. The government preferred to continue planning for the financial and economic
reconstruction of the country, while maintaining the defense budget at a supposedly low
level of 850 million guilders for 1949. This was about about 5.1 percent ofGNP at the
time, which, interestingly however, was relatively greater than at any time since 1815. 93
During a November 1948 visit to Holland, UK Field Marshal Bernard Law
Montgomery urged the Dutch to begin building up their army within the Allied framework.
He asked for an army corps of three divisions by the end of 195 1 . However:
The political will to increase military efforts was, in reality, lacking.
In March 1949, the cabinet approved a defense plan running to 1956, the
so-called 'Lagerplan 1950,' that required an increase in neither the budget
nor the length of military service. The implementation of the Montgomery
plan was thereby postponed indefinitely. 94
These burdent-sharing limits were evident in other ways as well at this early
stage of the Netherlands' membership in NATO, as the Dutch government, consistently
without regard to an ever-increasing Soviet threat, proceeded with the single-minded
economic recovery of their country. 95
At the outbreak of the Korean War (one of most important dividing lines in
the Cold War) however, one can see a significant turning point in the Netherlands'
alignment. In March, 1951, after long and complicated discussions, the government finally








million a year. Harst concludes that "[t]wo years after the creation ofNATO, the
Netherlands had eventually become a faithful member of the alliance, prepared to meet
NATO requirements, i.e., to have five divisions ready by 1954.
"
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Heavy industrialization of the country and the previous preference for
financial and economic stability in the postwar period allowed for a rather steady allocation
of budgetary resources for defense during the 1960's and 1970's. From 1965 to 1970, cuts
in the size of the armed forces led to a drop in defense expenditure from 4 percent to 3.5
percent of GNP. Since 1970, however, spending has not dropped below 3.3 percent of
GNP. 97
In May, 1997 moreover, the final communique of the North Atlantic
Council called for a long-term defense programme to revitalize the alliance through the
improvement of conventional and nuclear deterrence forces. The Netherlands agreed to
rectify serious deficiencies in joint defense arrangements and aim for a three-percent,
after-inflation increase in defense spending as a way to provide the resources needed to
improve capabilities. The defense budgets for 1979 through 1983 were also based on a
commitment to three-percent growth, which caused the Netherlands to build the most
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Alongside the development of defense programs, the Dutch economy
allowed for generous welfare programs, which did not enable the Dutch government to
respond flexibly to a request in 1985 by the Reagan administration for approval and
financial participation in the research and development portion of the Strategic Defense
Initiative (SDI). Because Germany refused direct participation in this project and the fact
that following detente and disarmament, policies between superpowers led to the end of the
SDI project, this reluctance by the Dutch did not hold serious consequences for their image
of a reliable partner among allies.
The economy grew at a real average annual rate of 1.9 percent over the
decade between 1985 and 1994, but relatively costly public expenditures and consequential
deficit financing were exacerbated by a recession in 1992-1993. During this period
unemployment rose to over eight percent. Expansion resumed in 1994-1996, with
unemployment falling to less than 7 percent by late 1 996 and inflation remaining low at
around 2.5 percent." This optimistic economic development together with military reform
enabled the Netherlands to meet expectations on burden-sharing. As Bitzinger notes:
For a small nation, the Netherlands endeavors to maintain a
well-rounded, three-service military, and for the most part the Dutch have
worked hard to live up to their Alliance defense commitments. They have
purchased sophisticated weapons systems and kept their military standards
and professionalism high. Indeed, the Dutch armed forces are a good
example of the kind of security contribution a small nation can make to the
Alliance.
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Despite the initial reluctance to allocate sufficient material and financial
sources to increase defense capabilities, the Netherlands increased its contributions step by
step, and watched its level vigilantly in comparison to other allies. This policy tremendously
contributed to the good positionof the Dutch among its allies.
The Netherlands, during its NATO membership, carried out a transparent
security and defense policy, closely bound to NATO strategy, and devoid of any alternative
doctrines of solely national concern. This political platform was supported by a developed
level of defense cooperation, and the Dutch willingness to share risks and its fair burden of
the collective defense. This security and defense policy helped generat the high level of the
Dutch in the Alliance that can be seen today.
2. Strategic Political Culture
The main factors that define strategic political culture are 1) degree of political
consensus on basic principles of security and defense policy; 2) public support by political
elites for that kind of policy; and 3) the amount of support among the citizens. This
variable does not refer exclusively to the category of small states. The relationship between
strategic political culture, on one hand, and security and defense policy, on the other, is
mutually interactive. The security and defense policy generates a certain kind of strategic




Since 1949, The Netherlands has enjoyed broad domestic consensus on
national security policy and the country's role within the Alliance. 101 Dutch society and
politics were centered around traditional institutions called "pillars," which included the
church, the labor movement, and other ideological subsocieties. 102 The pillars were
composed of Christian (Reformed and Catholic churches), Socialist/Labor, and Liberal
elements (comprising secular opponents to the Socialistic bloc and, contrary to its name,
occupying the right wing on the national political spectrum). These pillars formed the base
for the social and political life of this country. 103 Bitzinger notes, "Whatever the
composition of the coalition in power, national policy tended to vary little from
government to government." 104 With a such a high priority on the need for consensus and
governability, the parties agreed upon three basic concerns: continuation and expansion of
the welfare state, government subsidy of the domestic economy, and, especially, support
for the Western alliance. 105
Despite a certain left-right polarization in Dutch society since the
mid-1960's, the domestic consensus that formed around Dutch entry and commitment to
101
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NATO has endured. 106 From 1967 to 1982, among the political parties, only the small
Pacifist-Socialist Party unconditionally rejects NATO. The other small parties of the left
are openly critical ofNATO. Among the major parties in 1975, the PvdA (Labor)
congress staked continued NATO membership on progress toward detente. The other
parties actively support membership in NATO; over ninety percent ofCDA (Christian
Democratic Party) and WD (Liberal) party members favor NATO. 107
However, a debate over the 1979 NATO decision to deploy cruise missiles
has pointed out the potential vulnerability of the consensus on security policy. 108 The
Socialist/Labor element of the political spectrum, as in Germany and other western
European countries, turned this debate into a tool of their populist policy, which
undermined an initially strong political consensus in Dutch society. 109
Since that time, military spending has become a gauge ofwidening or
narrowing political unity regarding NATO. The discussions over long-term defense plans
has made defense policy decision-making a much more public issue. As Bitzinger notes,
"With the widening of the security debate and with the defense budget coming under much
106 Domke, p. 276.
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closer scrutiny, both domestic defense policy and overall NATO doctrine became a more
open process, subject to wider pressures from more disparate interests." 110
b. Public Support ofPolitical Leaders
Government officials are almost uniformly supportive ofNATO
membership. The Foreign Ministry conducts security policy in the context ofNATO and
has never been in a position to develop an alternative security policy. The dominant
political figure in this regard was Foreign Minister J. A. Luns. He has been a member of the
Cabinet for almost nineteen years (1952- 1971). The Dutch Policy under his leadership
always emphasized European integration and the strengthening of Atlantic co-operation.
Foreign Minister Luns was appointed as Secretary-General ofNATO in 1971 and has
became the symbol of pro-American foreign policy. 111
He was not the only one, however. In the person of Foreign Minister Dirk
U. Sticker, later a Secretary-General ofNATO and leader of a number ofDutch
committees and subcommittees in NATO, Mr. Luns found a successor to his Euro-Atlantic
security and defense policy. When the ability to come to any decision in case of cruise
missile deployment was complicated, there was Foreign Minister van den Broek, who
"enthusiastically supported full deployment according to NATO policy." 112 The firm
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whose educational and working backgrounds took place in the USA (a PhD from John
Hopkins University and work at the World Bank in Washington, DC, respectively). He
desires that Dutch defense reform be tied closely to NATO's structural changes in the spirit
of "A New Strategic Concept."
c. Support of Citizens
As Bitzinger has noted, "[n]ot only political parties but also trade unions,
schools, newspapers, broadcasting, hospitals, and even soccer teams were organized along
the lines of the pillars." 113 The strong support among the citizens to alignment gave
political figures a mandate to deal positively with the Alliance on a long-term basis. An
overwhelming majority of the Dutch population - some 75 to 80 percent - has consistently
supported their country's membership in NATO. In, general the Dutch perceive the NATO
alliance as their best guarantee for Western security. 114 In a 1988 poll of the Dutch
Atlantic Commission, 46 percent of the Dutch population said "No" to a European defense
without American participation. 115
According to Bitzinger, "Conceptually, the public's and domestic elites'
embrace of several principles of the traditional security consensus remains intact. Support
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defense and the need to fulfill one's commitments to NATO." 116 However, as the nuclear
debate showed, the traditional political consensus on security and defense issues is not
perfectly uniform in the application of domestic policy, which, nevertheless, did not have a
very negative impact on long-term position of the Dutch in NATO.
There has been a characteristically strong consensus among Dutch political
parties on the basic principles of security and defense policy since the very beginning of the
Netherlands' membership in the Atlantic Alliance. The strong pro-Alliance personality of
the Dutch officials and their permanent and decisive public support for the Alliance has
generated among its citizens a great deal of support for a Dutch security and defense
policy, subordinated to the NATO strategy. Together with the transparent security and
defense policy of the Dutch, this general political culture, characterized by strong political
consensus, decisive support of political officials, and the widespread support of the Dutch
people, is the main position-building modulator that has contributed to the respectable
position of the Netherlands among its Allies.
C. CONCLUSION: THE POSITION OF THE NETHERLANDS IN NATO
The Netherlands was chosen as an example of a small state's effective security and
defense policy within NATO. Through permanent increases of its own defense capabilities
by affordably building strong armed forces, a small country can attain a respectful position




In having accomplished this goal, the Netherlands has twice occupied the position
of Secretary General ofNATO, twice the position of Deputy Secretary General, once
Director of the Private Office of the Secretary General, and once Assistant Secretary.
Other small countries do not have such a record. Only Belgium occupied the position of
the Secretary General once for a full-working period, and Norway once occupied the
position of Assistant Secretary. The Dutch officials have also occupied a number of
positions in various committees and subcommittees in the NATO political structure.
The Netherlands is also traditionally considered a mediator between Anglo-Saxons
and strong pro-Europeans in finding compromises. Because of this policy, the Netherlands
deserves a label of reliable ally, a title which the Dutch have indeed enjoyed for the many
decades of their NATO membership. The Netherlands has always been finding solutions
and compromises, and has never pushed its own defense agenda alone against their Allies'
will. Such a clean image in other eyes of the other allies and such a firm positioning in
NATO structures has allowed the Netherlands to maintain an active role in the
decision-making process.
While cleverly counting the costs and risks ofNATO membership, and comparing
them with the benefits, the Netherlands has come to generate security "profits" from its
membership in this collective defense organization. Logically, one must ask the following
questions: What contributed to this position the most? And what are the current limits and
opportunities (advantages) of this highly profitable attitude of the Netherlands?
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1. Dutch Limits
The limits derived from its history, its geo-strategic situation and its economic
situation are some of those which influenced the Dutch decision to reorient its national
foreign policy from neutrality to alignment. On the other hand, some of these limits,
including historical limits, have changed over time and developed new aspects.
a. Historical Limits
Dutch history provides its political decision makers with at least five reasons
why they should promote the policy of being a reliable NATO member. First, the
Netherlands has become a small power in international relations. The Netherlands is a small
state not only with respect to its physical size, but also with respect to its military, political
and economic power. Second, its policy of neutrality was not effective enough to isolate
the Netherlands dependably from major European conflicts of the 20th century. Third, loss
of state sovereignty, and other political, economic, military, social, and cultural
consequences of the German occupation placed high priority on the issues of defense and
security in Dutch policy making. Fourth, the Dutch people found NATO to be a useful
institution in solving their security concerns for the entire Cold War era. Finally, NATO's
flexibility to adjust its concept to the uncertain post Cold War world and its ability to
become a pillar of the new European security architecture persuaded the Dutch to maintain
a policy of aligment in NATO.
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b. Geo - Strategic Limits
The Dutch geo-strategic situation is characterized by five factors. First, the
Netherlands is small. Second, the Netherlands is located on the western European trade
crossroads. Third, the country is located among three major competitive European powers.
Fourth, a great portion of the land is below sea level. Finally, the country possesses a
strategic deposits of natutal resources.
c. Economic Limits
It is disputable whether we are dealing with economic limits at all in the
Dutch case. On one hand, the GDP is limited due to "smallness." On the other hand,
generally positive economic indicators suggest an advantage relative to comparable states.
Nevertheless, there have been four main elements of the Dutch economy that have
influenced Dutch policy in NATO. First, the Dutch experienced, firsthand, that their weak
defense resulted in the interruption of economic prosperity. Next, the subsequent economic
exploitation of the country under an aggressor caused mass hardship among the
population. Afterward, the Dutch emphasis on economic and financial recovery and the
relatively stable economic development in subsequent years created good starting points
for building strong, modern armed forces and for sharing the defense burden in accordance
with the demands of the alliance. Finally, the Dutch levels ofEuropean integration and
Atlantic cooperation created a great deal of interdependence in defense end economic
policies among the allies.
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2. Dutch Opportunities
The Dutch security and defense policy along with its strategic political culture
accelerated the effort among domestic political powers to encourage the country to
become a valuable member of the Alliance. The model that the security and defense policy
of the Netherlands provides can serve as a pattern of reasonable behavior within the
Alliance for a small state.
a. Security and Defense Policy
The main elements of the Dutch security and defense policy were defined in
the very beginning ofDutch membership in NATO:
- The preeminence ofNATO interests over other policy goals.
- The acceptance of U.S. leadership of the Alliance.
- The need for West German participation within NATO.
- An emphasis on strategic deterrence. 117
Most of these basic principles are still kept by the Dutch policy makers, though some of
them have changed with time and some new ones were identified throughout the almost
fifty-year Dutch membership in NATO.
The first was tight adherence to NATO's plans and NATO's policy. The
Netherlands did not develop any of its own security and defense alternatives, and
subordinated its policy altogether to NATO's one policy. The defense plans were derived




Second was the strengthening of their own national capability to meet the
provisions of Article 5 in practice. 118 The Netherlands consistently allocated defense
expenditures to realize all modernizing programs. Reductions, resulting from the Treaty on
Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE) and other treaties, carried out by the
Netherlands are coordinated with other allies so as not to throw NATO defense
capabilities out of balance.
Third is the supporting concept of nuclear deterrence through gradual
reductions. Although the Dutch armed forces share the nuclear tasks of the alliance
unconditionally, the country supports each further reduction in the European nuclear
theater.
Fourth is maintaining a Euro-Atlantic scope of European security and the
caution to build up exclusively European defense capabilities. The Netherlands does not
aspire to continental leadership; therefore, it dislikes the French and German efforts to
dominate Europe. The Netherlands supports Euro-Atlantic cooperation as the foundation
of European security architecture. It also considers the US conventional military and
nuclear presence in Europe to be the lynchpin ofEuro-Atlantic defense cooperation.
Fifth is the acceptance of the dominant power within NATO's structural and
political framework. The Netherlands, as a small state, respects US dominance and enjoys
its leadership within NATO's agenda.
Sixth is the acceptance of burden- and risk sharing. The Dutch government
not only positively responds to the alliance's requests for defense spending, but also
118 The North Atlantic Treaty, Washington DC, April 4, 1949.
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provides material and personnel for NATO commitments in "out-of-area" issues in to keep
order, force peace, and promote international security.
Seventh is increasing cooperation and integration with partners and
neighbors. The Netherlands collaborates not only in all major armed projects but also
integrates its armed forces within Benelux and with Germany. The further development of
close cooperation in political, economical, social and cultural areas is considered an
essential part of regional stability.
Eighth are certain limits of domestic policy. A deep examination of all main
aspects of the Dutch membership in NATO uncovers certain constraints on domestic
political powers. Support for nuclear deterrence has its limits. These limits are drawn by
the level of nuclear arsenal on national soil and the public acceptance of that level.
Last is the allocation of national wealth, a public issue. The people are not
willing to abandon expensive welfare and health programs, and current decision-making is
often narrowed to making a choice between defense and social options.
b. Strategic Political Culture
The strategic political culture of the Dutch has been configured almost
perfectly to allow the Netherlands to maintain a steady course in its effort to build an
advantageous position within NATO. By analyzing strategic political culture in all its
detail, three main points can be highlighted.
First, the Dutch political scene enjoys broad consensus of major political
powers. The existence of this strong consensus, evident from the beginning of Dutch
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membership in NATO, still shows no sign of abating under the changing security
circumstances in Europe.
Second, the Dutch people have consistently supported political elites in their
approach to security and defense issues and to NATO policy. Such support has been
evident in two major directions. On one hand, it has directly influenced the meaning of
policy makers of NATO community; on the other hand, it has influenced domestic public
poles.
Thus, finally, the Netherlands has enjoyed an extremely high level of
support from its citizens for its security and defense policy. A great number of Dutch
citizens have expressed support for the Dutch commitment to NATO and to US
participation in European defense. However, Dutch decision makers do not have
unrestricted support in nuclear issues. The Dutch people do not support any further
escalations of nuclear weapons in Europe as a strategy of deterrence.
This analysis of the lessons the Dutch have learned from its history, their
geo-strategic situation, and economic factors should help one to understand the main
factors which were taken in consideration by Dutch post World War II decision makers,
ending in the the reorientation of their foreign policy from neutrality to alignment.
Moreover, the analysis of position-building modulators helps one to identify and
understand the main elements of the Dutch security and defense policy and strategic
political culture that built so strong a position of the Netherlands in NATO.
A summary of these two analyses will be useful in comparing and contrasting them
with the case of the Czech Republic. The chief aim of such a comparison would be to help
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define this new member's expected position within NATO, and to help uncover any
weaknesses which the Czech Republich may find useful in avoiding in order to achieve a
roughly equivalent position to the Dutch in NATO.
65
66
ffl. CASE STUDY: THE CZECH REPUBLIC
This part of the thesis analyzes the events of national history, the aspects of
country's geo-strategic situation, and the domestic economic factors that led to the
strategic decision to resolve its security concerns within the North Atlantic Treaty
Organization.
A. DETERMINANTS OF STRATEGIC DECISION MAKING
1. Lessons from History
As Kotvun and Masaryk have noted, "[t]he history of the Czech nation is a
meaningful part of world history. The Czechs deserved recognition as the carriers of
universal values in view of their struggle for spiritual freedom." 119 However, because of
its history, the Czechs have never had a dependable security system in modern history that
would secure them from the expansion of a Great military power or that would allow them
to enjoy spiritual freedom. The Czech nation has had bitter experiences both from a weak
system of collective security, and from the system of collective defense under the unlimited
imperial rule of the leading power of the alliance it joined with the Soviet Union in 1955.
Four historical lessons can be drawn from this experience. Firstly, the Czech
Republic, considering its size and geographical location, cannot rely on a system of
119 George J. Kotvun, "T. G. Masaryk: The Problem of a Small Nation" in Czechoslovakia
1918-88 , ed. H. Gordon Skilling (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1991), p. 30.
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collective security. Secondly, the abandonment of national sovereignty on behalf of a great
power's demands without a single gunshot does not save a small state fully from
consequences of the war, such as the exploitation of its economy, the devastation of its
cultural heritage, and casualties in its population. Thirdly, making military pacts with
authoritarian regimes can lead to an invasion by former allies. Finally, the end of the Cold
War itself has not solved the Czech nation's security concerns.
Since, democracies generally do not fight each other, uncertainties, risks, and newly
emerging threats in post Cold War Europe should be responsibly eliminated within a
system of collective defense among democracies. The acknowledgment of these facts,
based on a deliberate examination of the more than seventy-year history of an independent
Czechoslovak state, was a key element in the formation of the new Czech security and
defense policy in the post-communist era. The events of the 1938 Munich agreement
played one of the most decisive roles in this history.
a. Ineffective Collective Security (1919-1 938)
The circumstances surrounding the Munich conference of four powers,
which had a critical influence on the survivability of the Czech nation, are deeply rooted in
the Czech people's hearts and comprise an essential part of the country's collective
memory. 120 The most frequently used expressions among the Czech's describing the
120 Knudsen, p. 12. "For the development of stable relations between states, trust is essential.
Historical experience is the strongest conditioner for the development of trust. The leaders of
a democratic small state cannot deviate too much from the dictates of the collective historical
memory if they are to remain on good terms with their own people. Even more, they cannot
escape the influence from their own share of that collective memory."
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perfidious behavior of France and Britain in this historical context, are betray, dictate, and
simply, Munich. The events in Munich persuaded the Czechs that foreign policy anchored
to a system of collective security is not strong enough to save a nation from major
European conflicts, and they became determined to join not only the Warsaw Treaty
Organization after World War II, but also NATO during the post-communist era.
An independent Czechoslovak state was founded on ruins of the Austro-Hungarian
empire on October 28, 1918 after the end of the World War I. According to the Treaty of
Versailles, the Czechoslovak Republic was established as a multinational federation of
three lands: Bohemia and Moravia, Slovakia, and Subcarpathian-Ruthenia (annexed by the
Soviet Union and incorporated into the Ukraine in October 1944).
According to Kotvun, " the Czechoslovak Republic, imperfect as it was,
was a decent, nonviolent, progressive state." 121 The First Republic was a unitary state built
upon a liberal, Western-style constitution, and the principles of a pluralistic democracy. 122
121 George J. Kotvun, p. 37.
122 David W. Paul, p. 21. "The system embodied many liberal principles such as separation of
church and state, guarantees of individual rights, and due process of law. A bicameral
parliament was elected by universal suffrage; the parliament in turn elected the president, who
appointed the prime minister and cabinet. Members of parliament were chosen by a
complicated method of proportional representation that guaranteed seats to all parties with a
substantial electoral constituency."
Hans Brisch and Ivan Volgyes, Czechoslovakia: The Heritage of Age Past , (New York:
East European Quarterly, 1979), p. 98. The Constitution of 1920 "defined Czechoslovakia as
a democratic state, modeled on western countries, especially France, but often went beyond
these models to respond to the contemporary requirements of democratic societies, certain
particular needs of the Czechoslovak people and state, and various commitments undertaken
in the peace treaties. Thus it guaranteed Czechoslovak citizens the customary rights and
freedoms of western democracies, but added some new ones, e.g. the right to work and social
insurance, as well as women's suffrage, and protection of marriage, motherhood and family."
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According to David W. Paul, "For twenty years Czechoslovakia had
remained a viable and true democracy, despite being surrounded by increasingly
undemocratic and hostile states. Moreover, its economy, despite weak spots, was one of
the strongest and most advanced in Europe." 123
The post World War I foreign policy makers shared president Wilson's
enthusiasm for the League of Nations and collective security overall.
124 Edvard Benes, first
foreign minister, created a network of treaties to ensure the rise of democracy. Treaties
with Yugoslavia and Romania (1920-21) formed the so-called Little Entente among these
123 David W. Paul, Czechoslovakia: Profile of a Socialist republic at the Crossroads of Europe .
(Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1981), p. 25 and pp. 102-103. "... Czechoslovakia was
one of the most highly industrialized and economically advanced states in Europe - the fifth
greatest industrial power on the continent, by some estimates. The proportion of the
population engaged in industry, commerce, banking, and transportation - the more 'modern'
sectors of the economy - was greater in Czechoslovakia than in France. Per capita income was
comparatively high. Export goods were known to be of dependable quality, and from railroads
cars to the renowned Bat' a shoes, Czechoslovak products competed well in the European
markets."
124
President Woodrow Wilson influenced not only the foreign policy of Czechoslovakia, but
he had a lion's share in establishing the independent state itself On June 29th, the Wilson
Administration recognized the right of all Slav peoples to freedom and independence. On
September 3rd, 1918 President Wilson granted full recognition to the provisional government
of the emerging independent state. On October 18th, the President sent a diplomatic note to
the Emperor King Carl of Habsburg, rejecting the separate peace games. On the same day,
Professor Masaryk, a head of the Czechoslovak movement for independence abroad, and later
on the first President of Czechoslovak Republic,-proclaimed Czechoslovak independence in
Washington. On October 28th, Emperor Carl capitulated to President Wilson's Fourteen
Points in which he called for freedom and independence of Slavic nations. [See John O. Crane
and Sylvia Crane, Czechoslovakia: Anvil of the Cold War
.
(New York: Praeger Publishers,
1991), pp. 55-60]. In honor of President Woodrow Wilson, the Main Railway station in
Prague bears his name.
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three states, all of which were threatened by Hungarian claims on their territories. 125 In
1 924 Czechoslovakia signed a mutual defense treaty with France against unprovoked
aggression, obviously meant as protection against a resurgent Germany. 126 And, in 1935, a
treaty was signed with the Soviet Union, providing for Soviet assistance in the defense of
Czechoslovakia, but contingent upon France's honoring its commitment to come to
Czechoslovakia's aid. 127 France also assisted in the training of Czechoslovak military and
the government personnel, according to the Maginot Line pattern, a profound chain of
fortifications around boundaries equipped by modern arms from the Skoda factory. The
expenditure on defense was higher still: normally between fifteen and twenty percent of
GDP. In the year 1938, planned expenditures rose to 44 percent. 128
After the Anschluss of Austria in March 1938, Czechoslovakia became the
next target of Hitler's aggressive designs. As Konrad Henlain, Nazi Party member and
Party chief of the Sudetenland, asked Hitler, Germany stepped up demand for the
125 Hans Brisch and Ivan Volgyes, Czechoslovakia: The Heritage of Age Past . (New York:
East Europea n Quarterly, 1979), pp. 106-107.
126
Igor Lukes. Czechoslovakia Between Stalin and Hitler: The Diplomacy ofEdvard Benes in
the 1930's . (Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press, 1996), p. 34.
127
Ibjd^ p. 44.
128 David Vital, The Survival of Small States: Studies in Small Power/Great Power Conflict .
(London: Oxford University Press, 1971), p. 15. Figures showing defense expenditures:
Total national budget Allocation for defense






1 938 (extraordinary budget) 2,360
D. Vital derived these figures chiefly from Statistical Handbook ofthe Czechoslovak Republic, 1 943.
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integration of the Sudetenland (the Czechoslovakian territory around the boundaries with
Germany and populated by a German majority for 700 years) into the German Reich. As a
result, after a great deal of diplomatic negotiations with London, Paris, Berlin and
Moscow, the Czechoslovak President partially and later fully called on the reluctant Allies
to mobilize and fulfill their military obligations. However, Germany found this act
provocative. France and Britain were seeking to avoid war at any price. 129 At the Four
Power conference in Munich on 29 September 1938, Chamberlain, Daladier, Mussolini,
and Hitler after coming to an agreement, read a communique to the Czechoslovak officials,
who had not been admitted into the conference chamber, that the western Allies would not
support them if they resisted German annexation of the Sudetenland. 130 In an annex to the
treaty, the British and French governments, in accord with the Anglo-French proposals of
September 19th, provided an "international guarantee of the new boundaries of the
Czechoslovak state against unprovoked aggression." 131 The president, in spite of of an
eager military, 132 decided not to fight, but to accept conditions of the dictate. 133 Thus, the
129 Josef Korbel, Twentieth-Century Czechoslovakia
.




131 John O. Crane and Sylvia Crane, Czechoslovakia: Anvil of the Cold War
.
(New York:
Praeger Publishers, 1991), p. 166.
132 Edvard Benes, Mnichovske dny
. (London: Oxford University Press, 1955), pp. 1 15- 1 17.
General Chief of Staff, General Krejci, the Inspector-General of the Forces, and the Prime
Minister, General Syrovy, persuaded President Benes to defend the country's integrity
without allies: "We must go to war," they said, "regardless of consequences. The Western
powers will be forced to follow us. The population of the Republic is united, (sic) the army is
resolute, anxious to fight. And even ifwe were left alone we must not yield; the army has the
duty to defend the national territory, wants to go and will go to war." Quoted in David Vital,
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large and well-equipped Czechoslovakia!! military was disarmed at the order of political
authorities.
134 The disarmed units left the modern system of fortifications and marched
inland. 135
The Survival of Small States: Studies in Small Power/Great Power Conflict
,
(London: Oxford
University Press, 1971), p. 48.
133 John O. Crane and Sylvia Crane, p. 159. Munich dictate was arranged in accordance with
so called Godesberg Memorandum:
"1. Withdrawal of the whole Czech armed forces, the police, the gendarmerie, the customs
officials, and the frontier guards from the areas to be evacuated.
2. The evacuated territory is to be handed over in its present condition.
3. The Czech Government discharges at once all Sudeten Germans serving in the armed
forces or the police anywhere in the Czech state territory ...to return home.
4. The Czech Government liberates all political prisoners of German race.
5. The German Government agrees to permit a plebiscite to take place in those areas [to
be] more definitely defined, before at latest, the 24th November ...The plebiscite ... [to be]
carried out under ... an international commission."
"An appendix emphasized a prohibition against destroying or rendering unusable . .
.
military, commercial or traffic establishments... air services and all wireless stations... rolling
stock of the railway system.... undamaged... utility services (gas works, power stations, etc.)...
Finally, no foodstuff, goods, cattle, raw materials are to be removed."
134
Ibid. , p. 157. "Czechoslovakia had a standing army of 200,000 men with a million in
reserves, including 200,000 experienced Legionnaires, who had undergone a month's training
annually. The population was intensely patriotic, yielding high morale. The armed forces had
mechanized heavy artillery and a plethora of guns. Czechoslovakia had for years been a major
exporter of arms fabricated in the Skoda and Brno iron, steel, and munitions works."
135
Ibid. , p. 167. "As for direct military supplies, Germany obtained more than !,500 modern
aircraft left intact on the airfields, along with vast supplies of guns and munitions. Regarding
the fortifications, after the war Field Marshal Wilhelm Keitel and Marshal Fritz von Mannstein
candidly admitted at the Nuremberg military trials that they did not believe Germany then had
the power to break through the barrier. As Hitler had whispered to II Duce at the conclusion
of the Munich conference, the settlement would immediately release 30 divisions for
deployment elsewhere."
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A central fact in this crisis was that Czechoslovakia, a small power, had
seized the European initiative without consultation with Allies.
136
It is an irony of history
that France and Britain, after using force without previous consultation in NATO to regain
control of the Suez Canal in 1956, were humiliated by the USA, a greater power in the
Alliance. Their action merited them the label of "unworthy and unreliable" allies and it
marked a "betrayal of the community leading to violation of consultation norms and the
temporary breakdown of the collective identity" 137 Unlike Czechoslovakia after Munich,
however, they suffered only from moral and economic losses.
Thus, the Munich case became a classical paradigm of what can happen to a
small state within a weak system of collective security. 138 This national collective memory
had a great influence on the post-communist Czechoslovak (and later Czech leaders) in
their pursuit of a vigorous system of collective defense by anchoring the state within
NATO. 139
136 Henderson B. Braddick, Germany. Czechoslovakia, and the cGrand Alliance' in the May
Crisis. 1938
. (Denver Colorado: University of Denver, 1969), p. 19.
137 Thomas Risse-Kappen, pp. 83-84.
138 David Vital, The Survival of Small States: Studies in Small Power/Great Power Conflict
.
(London: Oxford University Press, 1971), p. 19. "If the policy of the small nation is
specifically one of identification with a larger one for furtherance of its own interests, it may
therefore be expected that sooner or later, as the mutual interests erode and as the views
diverge, one oftwo results will follow. The small state will enter into conflict with the larger
one; or else it will subside into vassalage, in other words, be forced to subordinate its own
interests to those of the master-state."
139
Knudsen, p. 12. "The collective historical experience of a nation tends to become
embedded in people's minds and creates strong preconceptions that serve as constraints for
joint political action."
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However, the Munich dictate was not the final betrayal of France and
Britain to the Czechoslovak people. According to Brisch and Volgyes, "In less than six
months, they were betrayed for the second time by their one-time western friends." 140
When Hitler occupied Bohemia - Moravia, six month later, in March 1939, France and
Britain did not assist in the defense of the country's new boundaries.
b. Consequences of World War II
Six months before the outburst ofWorld War II on March 15, 1939, the
Nazi Wehrmacht marched into Czechoslovakia, meeting no resistance. On March 16, Hitler
arrived in Prague and proclaimed Bohemia and Moravia a German protectorate. The
hardship of the Czech people under German rule, as a direct consequence of a weak
foreign policy of collective security, was the second main point historical lesson that led to
the decision to join the North Atlantic Alliance.
Firstly, the Czechoslovak Republic ceased to exist as a sovereign
independent state. Early after the Sudetenland's integration in the German Reich, Poland
and Hungary also occupied part of the Czechoslovakian territory. 141 The day before
declaration of the Protektorat Bohmen undMdhren, both Slovakia and Subcarpathian
140 Hans Brisch and Ivan Volgyes, p. 119.
141 Czechoslovakia: A Country Study , p. 44. "After Munich, Bohemia and Moravia lost about
38 percent of their combined area, as well as about 2.8 million Germans and approximately
750,000 Czechs to Germany. Hungary received 1 1,882 square kilometers in southern Slovakia
and southern Ruthenia; only 53 percent of the population in this territory was Hungarian.
Poland acquired Tesen and two minor border areas in northern Slovakia."
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Ruthenia proclaimed their independence, and became fascist vassal states. 142 Despite the
fact that the Czech government had not been dissolved, Hitler named a Reichsprotektor
Konstantin von Neurath, German advisers were appointed to government departments, the
Gestapo assumed policy authority, and several local German administrative offices were
established to take control of the territory. 143
Secondly, economic losses were enormous. 144 Immediately after the war,
Czechoslovakia lost important industrial capacity and deposits of raw materials. 145 Within
the protectorate, all industries worked for the Reich and all industries not related to war
were prohibited. Thousands of Czechs were drafted to work under German supervision
and 30,000 laborers were sent to work in Germany. 146 Gold reserves in the amount of 18.4
tons were moved to Germany and to the USA after the end of the war. Before the very end





Czechoslovakia: A Country Study , p. 47.
144
Korbel, p. 238. "National looses were equal to the whole of the national income from the
years 1932-33 to 1937-38."
145
Crane, p. 167. By the integration of the Sudetenland to Germany, the Czechoslovak
economy lost the following resources: " 66% of her coal and 80% of her lignite. Her industrial
losses, according to German statistics, amount to 70% of her iron & steel, 80% of her textiles,
75% of her glass, 86% of her chemicals, 90% of her news type, 40% of her timber, and 70%
of her electric power supplies."
146
Czechoslovakia: A Country Study, p. 47.
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Thirdly, there were material and moral losses in the armed forces. After
frontier fortifications were abandoned by the Czechoslovakian army, the Germans instantly
removed the military equipment and stocks to Germany. 147 Moreover, since the armed
forces were disbanded, the high level of military prestige in society that was attained during
the inter-war period has never been regained. 148
Fourthly, the Czechoslovakian nation was supposed to be swept off the map
of Europe. 149 Nazi terror was aimed specifically against the Czech intelligentsia.
Universities, theaters, and the National Opera were closed, numerous organizations were
dissolved and political parties forbidden. 150 Prominent democratic journalists, writers,
147
Korbel, p. 158. Military equipment transferred to Germany: "1,213 airplanes; 2,253 pieces
of light and heavy artillery; 501 aircraft guns and 1,966 antitank guns; 810 tanks; 603,000
rifles, 57,000 machine guns, 1 14,000 pistols; and over 1 billion rounds of ammunition for the
infantry and over 3 million rounds for artillery."
148 Rakowska-Harmstone, Warsaw Pact: The Question of Cohesion
.
(Ottawa: ORAE, 1986),
pp. 349 and 392.
149
Korbel, pp. 157-158. "Hitler had given vent to his hatred of the Czechs as early as 1932,
when he told Hermann Rauschning that he would '...transfer the Czechs into Siberia or the
area of Volhynia and ... assign them to reservations in the new federated states. The Czechs
must be removed from Central Europe. As long as they remain there, they will be the focus of
Hussite-Bolshevik disruption.' During World War II, Berlin prepared several plans for solving
the Czech problem. First, the Nazis planned to exile the entire Czech population in the East.
When they came to realize that they were in need of the Czech labor force, however, the
Nazis concluded that one part of the Czech people would be transported to the East, another
part would be germanized, and the rest would be exterminated. Studies were undertaken to
determine (by the measurement of skulls) which Czechs were anthropologically 'suitable' for
the process of germanization."
150
Brisch and Volgyes, p. 126. On November 15, 1939, Hitler "ordered the arrest of more
than 1,800 Czech university students and teachers, nine ofwhom were summarily shot and
several hundred deported to a German concentration camp. On the same day Hitler ordered
the closing of all Czech universities and colleges, thus initiating the first stage of his long-term
plan to deprive the Czechs of their intelligentsia and to facilitate thereby their eventual
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teachers, and priests were herded into concentration camps. Before the war ended,
360,000 Czechoslovak citizens had been held in concentration camps and prisons, and
235,000 had died there. 152
Thus the political, military, economic, social and cultural consequences of
the Nazi occupation during World War II formed further tiles in the mosaic of national
collective memory, which contributed to the decision to join the Alliance.
c. Collective Defense ofAuthoritarian Regimes (1955 - 1990)
The Czechoslovakian state, enjoying the "security benefits" from
membership in the Warsaw Treaty Organization since 1955, experienced yet more
bitterness. The lesson was that integration in a collective defense system is not
automatically a solution for the concerns of a small power. Security depends on the kind of
the coalition and its qualitative parameters. Thus, authoritarian regimes tend to create only
authoritarian military-political coalitions, accompanied by a lack of respect for the
sovereignty of smaller partners in the coalition. The invasion of Czechoslovakia by Soviet
troops in 1968 along with a mere symbolic contingent of other "fraternal" armies is a
classic example of such a case.
In accordance with the Yalta negotiations, Czechoslovakia was liberated by







further political developments took place in this spirit. A common State of Czechs and
Slovaks was created again, yet Subcarpathian Ruthenia was integrated into the Ukraine.
The Communist Party won the elections in 1946. Heavy industry, mines, and banks were
nationalized. The Communist takeover in 1948 involved the taking of power by leftist
political powers, followed by the full implementation of a state-planned economy. 153 The
economy expanded enormously in the steel industry, machine production, and coal
mining. 154 However, years of huge economic progress alternated with years of stagnation.
153
Paul, p. 106. "On January 1, 1949, the first five-year plan was launched according to
central directives that were now mandatory rather than indicative. Heavy industry was
emphasized and ambitious goals were set: a 57 percent average increase in industrial
production, 93 percent in metallurgy, and 100 percent in heavy machinery. Two years into the
plan, all targets were raised dramatically - heavy industry by 80 percent over the estimates set
in 1948. Nearly half a million workers were expected to take jobs in industry. The second and
third five-year plans (1956-60 and 1961-65, respectively) were similarly aimed at building
heavy industry further, ... Nor was Slovakia left entirely out of the picture. Between 1948 and
1959, industrial production in Slovakia rose by 347 percent (compared to 233 percent in the
country as a whole)."
154 David W. Paul, p. 107.













Source: Author's calculations from raw data in Statisticka Rocenka, 1 957, 1 96 1 . "Final year of first five-year
plan.\Second year of interim plan (1 954-55). 'Final year of second five-year plan.
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948 1953" 1955 b I960 1
100 193 224 373
100 219 249 434
100 168 197 307
100 165 200 325
100 145 171 246
100 146 202 290
100 158 174 218
100 169 181 285
100 167 171 258
100 154 168 252
100 140 174 305
Reform forces inside the Communist Party criticized the economic model, and the New
Economic Model that limited central planning was approved in 1965.
The overall democratization of society softened censors' control in the
media and public debate, not only over the economic model, but also over the bureaucratic
political system. This reform movement, under the control of Party reformers, began in the
beginning of 1968. In April of 1968, Alexander Dubcek, a leader of the reform wing of the
Communist Party, passed the Action Program in the party's presidium. Through this
program, he proposed a new model of democratic socialism and nationalism, socialism with
a human face. Anti- Soviet articles and comments in the media stimulated anti-Soviet
moods in society. In response to Dubcek's initiative, the staff of the Klement Gottwald
Military-Political Academy in Prague drafted two documents in May 1968: "Notes on the
Action Program of the Czechoslovak People's Army," and " How Czechoslovak State
Interests in the Military Sphere are to be Formulated." The latter , known as the "Gottwald
Memorandum" 155 and distributed to all major political officials, involved strategic defense
options other than those found through WTO membership. This reform movement in
society was quickly interrupted by the invasion ofWTO armies.
155 Rakowska-Harmstone, p. 367."The Gotwald Memorandum identified three possible
defense strategies for Czechoslovakia: 1) the coalition principle (the alliance with the
Soviet Union and the other states of the Warsaw Pact), on which our defense system is
currently based, is subject to development and it is necessary to reconsider its validity in the
coming 10 to 15 years; 2) the possible coordination of defense in Central Europe without the
military potential of the USSR (some kind of military analog to the political Little Entente 'in
socialist form,' or some kind of collective security organization without a class
determination); 3) the possibility of neutralizing one's territory or pursuing a policy of
neutrality and relying on one's own means of defense."
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On, August 20, 1968, Warsaw Pact forces - including troops from Bulgaria,
the German Democratic Republic (East Germany), Hungary, Poland and the Soviet Union
- invaded Czechoslovakia. Approximately 500,000 troops, mostly from the Soviet Union,
participated in the operation. The invasion was meticulously planned and coordinated, as
the operation leading to the capture of Prague's Ruzyne International Airport in the early
hours of the invasion demonstrated. A special flight from Moscow, which had prior
clearance, arrived just as the Warsaw Pact troops began crossing the borders. The aircraft
carried more than 100 plainclothes agents, who quickly secured the airport and prepared
the way for a huge airlift. Giant An- 12 aircraft began arriving at the rate of one per minute,
unloading Soviet airborne troops equipped with artillery and light tanks. As the operations
at the airport continued, columns of tanks and motorized rifle troops headed toward
Prague and other major centers, meeting no armed resistance. Czechoslovak authorities, as
in the Munich crisis of 1938 and the Communist takeover of 1948, had confined the armed
forces to their barracks. By dawn on August 21, 1968, Czechoslovakia was an occupied
country, and Alexander Dubcek was kidnapped to Moscow. Soviet troops remained
stationed in Czechoslovakia and a program of "normalization"- the restoration of
continuity with the pre-reform period - was initiated. The democratization of
Czechoslovakia was delayed for more than twenty years.
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d Post - Cold War Disorder
The fall of the Berlin wall in 1989-1990 brought with it a wave of
democratic revolutions which smashed the old communist regimes in the states of Central
and Eastern Europe. The end of the Cold War also precipitated the end of the postwar
Yalta system in Europe. Uncertainties and newly emerging risks on the European continent
redirected the security and defense policies of post-communist governments toward
NATO. The first feeling of uncertainty was brought on by the process of German
reunification-shortly after the opening of the German border in 1990. Not only Germany's
small neighbors, but also its traditional competitors, France and Britain, were afraid of the
creation of a colossus which would militarily dominate Europe. Moreover, Western
European allies were afraid of resuscitating the old paradigm in German-Russia relations:
"Competition for influence in Central Europe, perhaps accompanied by sharing of roles." 156
When the governments of East and West Germany, France, Britain, the United States, and
the Soviet Union ("two plus four") negotiated conditions of German unification, German
Chancellor Helmut Kohl negotiated directly with Mikhail Gorbachev in the agreement of
July 16, 1990 on German membership in NATO, making the 'two plus four' negotiations
seem like a. proforma framework of secondary importance." 157 The questions that
accompanied the process of Germany gaining full sovereignty in 1990 were whether
Germany would remain neutral or establish a special relationship with Russia, whether
there would be further presence ofUS troops on German soil, and whether Germany




would accept the presence of any nuclear weapons at all. It is highly understandable that
these doubts were shared between not only France and Britain, but also among the smaller
neighbors of the prospectively unified Germany, like Czechoslovakia.
Second, uncertainty in the security of post Cold War Europe has been
produced by the situation in Soviet Union and later on in Russia. Despite the fact that there
was no longer any direct Soviet threat, unstable and unpredictable political developments in
the former superpower have been interpreted as potential threats to its currently
democratic former satellites. The Soviet Union faced two attempts at a. putsch in the early
1990's, and the course that political reforms in Russia have taken has not guaranteed that
the military will remain in its barracks. As Lilia Shevtsova notes, "The absence of strong
political institutions and of mechanisms for civilian control of the military increases the
likelihood that the armed forces will at some point interfere directly in the nations'
s
political life, perhaps through a military coup" 15*
Thirdly, the rebuilding of the European security architecture has generated
other risks to new democracies. The Warsaw Pact was formally dissolved on July 1, 1991,
and the former Soviet satellites in Central and Eastern Europe found themselves in a
security power vacuum. Initial enthusiasm among the small states for the Conference on
Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) evaporated because the organization lacked
teeth. Since 1991 Czechoslovakia has participated in the North Atlantic Cooperation
Council (NACC) (replaced by Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council in 1997), an advisory
158
Lilia Shevtsova, "Russia's Fragmented Armed Forces" in Civil-military Relations and
Democracy." ed. Larry Diamond and Marc F. Plattner (Baltimore and London: The John
Hopkins University Press, 1996), p. 117.
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organ involving former WTO states. However, NACC neither makes obligations nor
offers guarantees with respect to military defense.
Finally, the disintegration of the artificially formed, multinational state-
formations in Europe and the subsequently emerging ethnic conflicts have been a further
source of uncertainty and risk. The Soviet Union ceased to exist in December 1991. After
the Baltic states declared their independence, so did the Ukraine and an array of other
former Soviet Republics. The disintegration of the former Soviet Union itself was
accompanied by the outburst of ethnic wars in Georgia and Azerbaijdzan. In 1991 the
Serbian-Bosnian crisis started, which resulted in a three-year civil war and the collapse of
the Yugoslavian Federation. The state of Czechoslovakia, also, began to splinter, and on
January 1, 1993, two independent states arose: the Czech Republic and Slovakia - with
what proved to be different paths to Euro-Atlantic integration.
Thus, the process of German reunification, the unpredictable development
of political reforms in the Soviet Union and Russia, the security vacuum after the erosion
of the Yalta system, and the emergence of ethnic conflicts in Europe were the
contemporary uncertainties, risks and threats which form part of the collective memory
influencing strategic decisions in the Czech Republic. The historical points that led Czech
decision-makers in the early 1990's to make strategic decisions toward NATO alignment
were: a) the failure of the collective security system in 1938; b) the consequences of World
War II; c) ills and shortcomings of the Soviet-led collective defense as highlighted in 1968;
and d) the major uncertainties, risks, and threats in post Cold War era. It must be
mentioned that most of these more or less bitter historical experiences resulted from both
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the overall geo-strategic situation of Czechoslovakia (the Czech Republic later on) and the
country's status as a successor of the former federative states.
2. Geo - strategic Situation
Professor T.G. Masaryk pointed out in 1900 the importance of geo-strategic
factors in Czech state security: 'The number of our population, our landlocked
position...force us to enter an association with other peoples and countries." 159 Some of
these factors have not changed with time and others have.. Those which significantly relate
to current decision-making are the size of the population and the country, its location, and
its deposits of strategic natural resources.
Situated at the geographical heart of Europe, the Czech Republic consists of
about 60 percent of the area of the former Czechoslovak federation. Its size (30,450 sq.
mi./78,864 sq. km.) is a little less than the size of the state of Maine. It is a landlocked
country, bounded by Slovakia on the East, Austria on the South, Germany on the West,
and Poland on the North. The political borders coincide for the most part with the natural
frontiers formed by the mountains of the Massif, which rings the country. The interior
terrain is a mixture of highlands and plains intertwined with rivers and streams. Including
the old Czech "crown lands" ofBohemia and Moravia (plus part of Silesia), the country
159 Kotvun, p. 30.
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has a population of 10,432,774 (July 1995 est.), 160 of which 94 percent is Czech, 3 percent
Slovak, and the rest, other small ethnic minorities. 161
The tiny population is the first constraint being taken into consideration in
the evaluation of the Czech Republic's geo-strategic situation. Limited human resources do
not provide enough manpower both for building a sufficient standing army, nor for the
mobilization of a "second echelon." In addition, this small population cannot produce
sufficient GNP to develop a significant defense infrastructure.
The second limit is the size of the country. From a military point of view,
the small territory does not allow enough space for operational maneuvers of any military
significance. Moroever, industrial and political targets in the Czech Republic can be
reached within several minutes in the case of an air attack, to several hours in the case of a
land campaign. Since the mountains on the borders of the Czech state do little to protect
the country in this industrial war age, this characteristic of the country's terrain no longer
plays any significant role in Czech defense.
The third limiting factor of the Czech Republic's geo-strategic situation is its
deposits of strategic raw materials. The Czech Republic has strategic deposits of uranium,
which increase the country's vulnerability to a great extent in the nuclear age. Annual
production in the mid-1980's was estimated by western analysts to be from 2,000 to 3,000
160
"Czech Republic" in The World Factbook 1995
. (Washington, DC: Central Intelligence
Agency, 1995), p. 112.
161
"Czech Republic," Political Handbook of the World: 1997 (1997), p. 215.
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tons. During the Cold War almost all production was exported to the Soviet union, which
was lacking in this "gun-powder" of the nuclear war.
The geographic location of the Czech Republic in Central Europe is the last
important factor. Deeply tied culturally to the West 162 and consanguineously as Slavs to the
East,
163
the Czech nation tends to switch its foreign policy relatively easily in the process of
balancing-Eastern and Western power interests. For example, the foreign policy of the First
Republic (1918-1938) was oriented in favor of Paris and London. The communist regime
(1948-1990), on the other hand, subordinated its foreign policy to the Soviet agenda.
Finally, the post-communist government switched its policy of integration back to Western
European political, economic and security structures.
The tendency for this country to play such a balancing act also extends to
the hands of other nations. Merely the country's location in the center of Europe on the
boundaries of empires to the North and South and to the East and West caused it to be
subject to reparations or power balancing by other powers. For example, Austria and
Prussia, the powers in the South and North, exchanged parts of Czech territory after the
Silesian wars ( 1 740-1 748).
164
In the West, Hitler occupied the Sudetenland in 1938, and
Bohemia and Moravia in 1939, and, in the East, Stalin took Carpathian Ruthenia in 1944.
162




Jaroslav Krejcif and Stanislav Sojak, Czech History . (Dubicko, Czech Republic: INFOA,
1993), p. 63.
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Even further back in history, the location of the country at the crossroads of
Europe caused the Czech territory to be plundered from all directions by raids from foreign
troops. Romans came from the South in the 1st century, then Hungarian tribes from Asia in
the 9th century, Swedes from the North in the Thirty Years' War, and Germans 165 from the
West during a more gradual migration which has lasted more permanently.
The best symbolic expression of the geo-strategic importance of the Czech
territory was the Battle of Three Emperors in Austerlitz (1805). Three emperors, the
French Emperor, the Austrian Emperor and the Russian Czar, met on the territory of the
Czech Kingdom on Napoleons' road to the East.
Thus, the current geo-strategic situation of the Czech Republic has been
determined by the small population and size of the country, its possession of strategic
natural deposits, and its geographic location in Central Europe. These factors must be
considered in strategic decision-making.
3. Economic Factors
There are three lessons to be drawn from an examination of the history of
economic development that should be considered when making strategic security and
defense decisions: 1) crucial discrepancies cannot be allowed to exist between the
165 Knudsen, p. 12. The historical record of Czech-German relations fully supports following
theoretical concept: "Here the reference is to the history of relations between the small state
and the nearest great power...The history of relations between great powers and their smaller
neighbors has a tendency to be marked by dominance and violence. It is not likely to inspire
trust between them. Thus history may work against attempts to stabilize a relationship of
power disparity."
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economic policy and the security system; 2) the costs of the previous security policy have
to be taken into. consideration; and 3) coordination must be achieved between economic
recovery policies and security systems
a. Economic Policy vs. Security System
An analysis of several economic aspects of the periods preceding the
political crises of 1938 and 1968, with respect to the nature of the security systems at the
time, highlights discrepancies between the economic policies and the security systems of
the periods. These discrepancies, in turn, contributed to crisis.
( 1 ) The First Republic.
The Czechoslovak democracy in the First Republic
(1918-1938) enjoyed a high level of economic prosperity. 166 However a weak system of
collective security failed to safeguard that economic prosperity. The main cause of this
failure was that in 1938 a large amount of industry was located in a territory with a heavy
German population. The ability to exploit such a key Czechoslovakian economic resource
1 sn
was due in part to the heritage of the Habsburg monarchy's industrial base, and in part to
166 Radoslav Selucky, "From Capitalism to Socialism" in Czechoslovakia. 1918-88 . ed, H.
Gordon Stalling (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1991), p. 160. "Czechoslovakia was already
among the six largest exporters of weapons in the world long before the Second World War."
167 Zora P. Pryor, "Czechoslovak Economic Development in the Inter-war Period," in A
History of the Czechoslovak Republic 1918-1948 ed. Victor S. Mamatey and Radomir Luza
(Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1973), p. 190. "It has been estimated that
43 percent of the total industrial labor force in pre- 1914 Austria and Hungary was employed
in Bohemia, Moravia, and Slovakia."
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Czechoslovakia!! economic policy after the World War I. The Government of the new
independent state, however, continued in the development of heavy industry in those
regions only; consequently, after the Sudetenland was cut off, Czechoslovakia became an
agrarian state. As a result, the established system of collective security, aimed against
Germany, was in disharmony with economic reality. Thus, economic potential of a high
order "failed to serve a concrete political purpose, and played no role in the defense of the
state when the test came in September 1938."
(2) 1960 's.
The events in Prague during the Spring of 1968 showed that
making corrections in order to align an economic policy with a security system is precluded
within an authoritarian system of collective defense. In the early 1960's, when the soviet
model of the state-planned economy was exhausted intellectually and incapable of further
conceptual progress, the Czech Economist Ota Sik introduced the"New Economic
Model" 169 in 1965. The need for economic reform, in turn, stimulated political reform as
168
Vital, p. 15.
169 David W. Paul, Czechoslovakia: Profile of a Socialist republic at the Crossroads of
Europe
.
(Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1981), pp. 111-112. "Briefly put, the NEM,
called for greatly limiting the role of the central planning authorities. They would no longer
plan every detail of production, allocation, and distribution; rather their task would be to set
basic targets. Most of the details of how the targets would be met were to be worked out by
middle- and lower-level planners, with the most important responsibility devolving to
enterprise managers. Industries would be managed on the basis of profitability, and plant
managers would have the authority to determine how the earnings of their plants were to be
used for investment, modernization, expansion, or wage bonuses. Wages and income scales
were to be "de-leveled"- that is, keyed more to workers' skills, education, and training - and
higher labor productivity was to be stimulated by bonuses and other forms of material
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well. A month after the introduction of Dubcek's "Action Program" in the Spring of 1968,
which included the political reform, the "Gottwald Memorandum" was issued, which
attempted to align the Czechoslovakian defense system with an economic policy reoriented
toward the West. The attempt to relieve the Czechoslovakian People's Army of the
Warsaw Pact command structure, and to set up cooperation with NATO failed. The
invasion of five armies from the Warsaw Treaty Organization in August of 1968 ended all
reforms and restored a firm client relationship between Czechoslovakia and the Soviet
Union.
b. Economic Exploitation
Both the exhaustion of the Czech economy in 1938-45 and the
failure to implement vital economic reforms in the 1960's were direct consequences of a
weak Czechoslovakian state security system. The subsequent devastation of the national
economy after the breakdowns of the 1938 and 1968 systems influenced the decision to
integrate the state into democratic systems of collective defense.
( 1 ) The Second Republic and Protectorate.
After the Munich dictate was accepted, Czechoslovakia lost
most of its industrial capacity, 29 percent of its territory, and 34 percent of its population.
incentive. The NEM further envisioned a return to certain features of the market: supply and
demand factors would play an important function in determining prices, in most cases within
government-imposed ceilings. The central planners, for their part, would continue to regulate
prices of such basic commodities as raw materials, energy, and imported capital goods."
91
The state was cut off from crucial sources of national wealth when it experienced these
industrial losses (58 percent in mining, and briquette works; 65.3 percent in the glass
industry; 59.8 percent in textiles; and 53.5 percent in the paper industry).
170
Although the war alone inflicted less physical damage on
Czechoslovakia than on most other European countries, the economic consequences were
considerable: "The protectorate of Bohemia and Moravia was turned into an important
source of input for the German war machine, emphasizing the production of coal, steel, and
armaments."
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Big industrial concerns and banks were taken over and losses in movable
property alone were between $0.5 and $1 billion. Some $100 million were extracted
annually from taxes.
(2) "Normalization ".
The period between the Soviet invasion in 1968 and the
democratic revolution in November 1989 (also known as the normalization period) was, in
economic terms, a return to the previous extensive period of centralized price-fixing. This
economic system remained essentially intact until 1989. 173 Reforms introduced during this







173 Jim Prust, et al., The Czech and Slovak Federal Republic: An Economy Transition
(Washington, D. C : International Monetary Fund, 1990), p. 3.
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3.1 2.5 2.1 0.8
0.5 1.0 2.9 1.0
-0.2 1.8 3.4 -1.0
0.5 0.1 0.2 1.4
1.5 2.0 2.3 2.3
appear in several sectors, and since then, the difficulties have multiplied. Table 1 illustrates
this economic decline through selected figures.
1970-75 1975-80 1980-85 1986 1987 1988 1989
(Change in percent)
Industrial production 6.7 4.4 2.6
Agriculture Production 2.2 1.9 1.8
Export of goods 5.0 11.8 5.4
Consumer prices 0.2 2.1 2.0
Nominal wages 3.5 2.7 1.8
Source: Jim Prust, et al., The Czech and Slovak Federal Republic: An Economy
Transition (Washington, D. C: International Monetary Fund, 1990), p. 51.
Table 1 . Percentage Decrease Across Time Within Major Economic, 1970-1989
The World Bank has noted that "[e]ven though the country has been
doing well compared to other centrally planned economies in the region, it is important to
stress that such a comparison is misleading since Czechoslovakia was one of the most
industrialized countries before World War II." 174 In 1938 Czechoslovakia had per capita
income comparable with that of Austria and Finland. As can be seen from data in Table 2,
the order changed significantly by 1990.
174 Czechoslovakia: Transition to a Market Economy (Washington DC: The World Bank,
1991), p. xii.
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Per Capita GNP Date Manufacturing
In 1990 U.S. dollars Employment Exceeded
1938a 1990 Agricultural Employment
Austria 1,800 19,200 1950
Czechoslovakia 1,800 3,100 1940
Finland 1,800 26,100 1950
Italy 1,300 16,800 1960
Hungary 1,100 2,800 1970
Poland 1,000 1,700 1970
Portugal 800 4,900 1980
Spain 900 10,900 1970
Bulgaria 700 2,200 1970
Greece 800 6,000 1990
Romania 700 1,600 1980
Turkey 600 1,600 1990
Source: G. Pohl and P. Sorsa, European Integration and Trade with the
Developing World, The World Bank, Washington DC, 1992 and OECD Historical
Statistics and World Bank Development Reports, various annual editions.
a The figures for 1938 have been adjusted to 1990 prices with the U.S. GDP
deflator. Cited in: East-Central European Economies in Transition: Joint Committee
Congress of the United States (Washington, DC: Joint Committee Print, 1994), p. 17.
Table 2. Per Capita Income, 1938 and 1990, and Approximate Date When Employment
in Manufacturing Exceeded Agricultural Employment for Selected Countries
The next economic factor playing a role in Czech strategic
decision-making was the devastation of the economy under Nazi rule and, later under the
rule of communist hard-liners. These situations deprived the Czechoslovakian citizens of
the living standards to which they had become accustomed.
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c. Economic Recovery
The final and, likely, the most important political economic factor
leading the Czech post-communist authorities to join NATO was the need to find a way
to economic recovery through a new political-economic orientation. The three main
economic prospects that prompted the decision to join the Euro-Atlantic security
structures were: 1) integration into western-European and World economic institutions;
2) a reorientation of foreign trade to the West; and 3) flows of investment capital from
the West.
After 1990, the government introduced economic reforms based on the
transformation from a centrally planned, to an open-market economy. The government
set up a strategic economic goal to the join European Union (EU). 175 To gain access to
financial funds the government of Czechoslovakia applied to rejoin the International
Monetary Fund and World Bank in early 1990. 176 The association agreement with the
175 James W. Morrison, NATO Expansion and Alternative Future Security Alignments ,
(Washington, DC: National Defense University Press, 1995), p. 81.
176
Bijan B. Aghevli, Eduardo Borensztein, and Tessa van der Willigen, Stabilization and
Structural Reform in the Czech and Slovak Federal Republic: First Stage (Washington DC:
International Monetary Fund, 1992), p. 10. To stabilize the exchange rate of Czech currency
in 1990 "access to IMF resources in the amount of up to $1.8 billion was provided under a
stand-by arrangement and the compensatory and contingency financing facility. Of this
amount, about $0.7 billion was disbursed in early January to boost the initial level of reserves
to about one and a half months of imports. Support from the IMF provided a respite while
other financial support could be arranged. Subsequently in 1991, commitments of about $1,5
billion were made by the European Community, the other industrial countries of the Group of
24, and the World Bank - of which about half is expected to be disbursed in 1991 and the
remainder in 1992."
Jim Prust, p. 2. "An Original member, Czechoslovakia withdrew from the Fund on
December 31, 1954, following the country's difficulties in providing information and
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EU, signed in 1 99 1 , has improved market access by reducing barriers to trade. For the
same reason, Czechoslovakia revitalized its membership in the General Agreement on
Tariffs and Trade (GATT), of which it was a founding member in 1947. The Czech
Republic has negotiated a trade agreement with the seven countries of the European Free
Trade Area (EFTA) and agreed upon a Central European Free Trade Agreement




Together with process of elimination of trade barriers, the Czech Republic
reoriented itself from trade with the East to trade with the West. Germany has replaced
the USSR as the main Czech trade partner; it received 26.9 percent of Czech exports and
provided 25.1 percent of Czech imports in 1993. Slovakia remains the second largest
trade partner, but the trend continues to be downward. Austria was the third largest
recipient of Czech exports with 9.8 percent, followed by the United Kingdom with 3.2
178
percent.
A great deal of foreign direct investment also comes from the West.
Foreign direct investment in the Czech Republic from 1990 through 1993 totaled over $3
billion (the Czech territory the recipient of 88 percent of foreign capital at the end of
consulting with the fund on exchange restrictions. Czechoslovakia withdrew from the World
Bank at the same time, remaining a member of the United Nations and the bank for
International Settlements."
177
East-Central European Economies in Transition: Joint Economic Committee Congress of




1992, with the remaining 22 percent going to Slovakia). The largest source of foreign
direct investment has been Germany, with a total of $64 1 million between 1 990 and 1 993
(31.2 percent of total foreign investment). The United States is the second largest source
of investment, with $572 million (27.9 percent), followed by France (12.6 percent),
Belgium (7.1 percent), and Austria (6.1 percent). 179
After the democratic revolution and the collapse of the centrally planned
economies of Eastern Europe, Czechoslovakia, like other countries of the former Council
for Mutual Economic Assistance (CMEA), enjoys prevalently Western European
assistance in the effort to develop a free market economy. 180
Integration into the western, and the world's economic institutions,
western capital flows, and a reorientation of trade policy to western markets are the main
elements of the Czech macroeconomic transformation. Achieving a strategic balance
between economic and security goals will increase the overall security of the Czech
Republic.
From an economic point of view, there have been three factors which have
determined strategic security decision-making in the country since 1990. First is the
historical lesson that there must be a highly rational balance struck between economic
policy and any external security system. The events ofMunich in 1938 and of Prague in




Ibid, p. xi. "Unlike the Marshall Plan era of 50 years ago, the United States is not the
principal force in this postwar period. The largest share of aid and commercial transactions is
from West Europe, which will also be the region's primary market for the foreseeable future."
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defense in coalition with authoritarian regimes leads to economic devastation. Secondly,
the high level of economic exploitation under both foreign rule and a client government
alarmed the Czech people. Both periods led to the diminishing of living standards to their
marginal limit. Finally, the provisions of any external economic relationship that is chosen
to help recover the economy and to help achieve permanent prosperity also reorient
domestic security and defense policies. The only way to avoid mistakes and to achieve
strategic economic goals with certainty is to ensure a high level of external security
through the integration into the Euro-Atlantic military-political structures of western
democracies.
B. POSITION BUILDING MODULATORS
Czech "security and defense policy" and Czech "strategic political culture" are
and will be the two main agents of the Czech Republic's position in NATO. Security and
defense policy has had clear orientation to closer military to NATO standards since early
1 99 1
.
However, it is evident that a good position in NATO cannot be achieved without
crucial changes in strategic political culture, the importance ofwhich has been neglected
thus far in the Czech Republic.
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1. Security and Defense Policy
In this section, the following question will be answered: What kind of security and
defense policy does the Czech Republic exercise? Since the positive Dutch attitude to
defense cooperation, policy coordination, risk-sharing, and burden-sharing merited the
Netherlands the NATO honor of reliable ally, this examination of Czech security and
defense policy will be carried out with respect to the same variables.
a. Defense Cooperation
As in the case of the Dutch, cooperation and friendly relations among
regional partners and NATO members is generally the core of the Alliance. The relatively
high level of the Czech Republic's security and defense cooperation in the region,
currently, has been attained through an evolutionary process of finding its own security
identity in two interdependent areas: dismantling the old Yalta system in Europe and
designing a new European security architecture.
Czechoslovak policy makers attempted coordinated the plans of Poland,
Hungary, and East Germany to dismantle both WTO and NATO 181 and transforming
them into a collective security system as framed in the Conference on Cooperation and
Security in Europe (CSCE). The Utopian notion of the Czechs intended, "... in effect,
[to] place the Germans and the Russians, plus the Western nuclear powers (America,
France, and Britain) under the supervision of Finns, Belgians, Poles, Norwegians, Danes,
181
"Az po sestiletem snazeni ma Praha clenstvi v NATO jiste," Mlada fronta-DNES, July
9, 1997, p. 1.
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Estonians, and the representatives of other small European nations for whom security
policy in the 20th century had been a high-risk spectator sport." 182 This vision was
quickly abandoned. Vaclav Havel, President of the Czech Republic, proclaimed to a joint
session of the United States Congress, it is untrue that he wanted to dismiss NATO. 183
Subsequently, steps were focused on dismantling WTO (Warsaw Treaty
Organisation) only. "At the June 1990 Moscow session of the PCC (Political
Consultative Committee), the final Communique, written by the central Europeans,
declared the end of the NATO-Warsaw Pact confrontation." 184 On 26 February 1990, an
agreement was signed for the complete withdrawal of Soviet forces from Czechoslovakia
by 1 July 1991. The Warsaw treaty organization was officially dissolved on 1 July 1991.
In the very early 1990's, the Czech policy makers also coordinated efforts in the so-called
"Pentagonal Group" of Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Austria, Yugoslavia, and Italy. At the
Vienna meeting on 20 May 1990, the group agreed upon the mediation of conflicts over
the treatment of ethnic minorities in central and southeast Europe through a CSCE
agency. 185
182
Christopher Jones, "Czechoslovakia and the New International System" in European
Security Policy After the Revolutions of 1989
. ed. Jeffrey Simon (Washington, DC:
National Defense University Press, 1991), p. 311.
183
"Joint Meeting of the House and Senate to Hear An Address by His Excellency Vaclav
Havel ...," 28 February 1990 in Congressional Record-House, 21 February 1990, pp. H
392-H 395.
184
Christopher Jones, p. 316.
185
Christopher Jones, p. 317.
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A few months after the failed August 1991 putsch in the former Soviet
Union, on October 6, 1991, the Ministries of Foreign affairs of Poland, Czechoslovakia,
and Hungary expressed the wish to commit their countries to NATO activities. 186 On
October 8, 1991, the Czechoslovakian government signed a treaty with Poland and later
on with Hungary, to include "security clauses providing for assistance in the event that
one of the partners is attacked." 187 Ongoing regional cooperation was oriented toward
NATO as a prospective pillar ofEuropean Security architecture. In November 1991,
Czechoslovakia joined the North Atlantic Cooperation Council,"the primary medium for
pan-European cooperation on security and stability," 188 as a consultative body in security
issues for former members ofWTO.
In contrast, the obviously passive popular attitude of the Czechs to the
Visegrad group (the Czech Republic, Slovakia (including Czechoslovakia before the
division in 1993) Hungary, and Poland) was often criticized. Czech Prime Minister
Klaus interpreted the Visegrad organization of Poland, Hungary, and the former
Czechoslovakia that was formed in 1990 as "...an artificial one that the West foisted on
186
"Jak se CR priblizovala Alianci," Pravo . July 1, 1997.
187 Vaclav Havel, Summer Meditations , (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, Inc., 1992), p. 95.
188 Charles L. Barry, The Search for Peace in Europe: Perspectives from NATO and
Eastern Europe , (Fort Lesley j. McNair: National Defense University Press, 1993), p.
300.
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Prague to keep it out of the West...," and he "... obstructed any political or military
cooperation under its auspices." 189
Due to subsequent pressure however, within post-January 1 994 efforts
within PfP, especially from the U.S., Prague began cooperating with Warsaw and
Budapest on a regional air-defense network. 190 In addition, further military cooperation
was developed. A result of this close two-year Czech-Polish military cooperation since
1995 has been the agreement to build Polish-Czech military units and to coordinate the
purchase of western jet aircraft. 191
Cooperation with Hungary was intensified as well. Twenty-seven joint
military exercises will take place on Hungarian territory in 1 997, and twenty-four in the
Czech Republic. Hungary also expressed its concern to buy the new Czech L-159
subsonic aircrafts. 192 After the NATO summit of July, 1997 in Madrid, where the
Alliance invited Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic to join NATO in 1997, the
Czech Republic held following meeting for the Ministries of Defense of the three invited
countries in the Czech Republic. There, they agreed upon an intensification of
189 Stephan J. Blank, Prague. NATO and European Security
.
(Carlisle Barracks,
Pennsylvania: US Army War College, 1996), p. 3.
190 Stephan J. Blank, p. 3.
191
"Vznikne spolecna polsko-ceska vojenska iednotka." Mlada fronta DNES . February 28,
1997.
192
"Mad'arsko chce ceske stihacky," Mlada fronta DNES . March 4, 1997.
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cooperation with Eastern European countries that are being considered for the second
wave ofNATO enlargement. 193
Cooperation was also tightening up to NATO. In April 1993, Deputy
Minister of Foreign Affairs Alexander Vondra publicly announced that the Czech
Republic's aim to join NATO was final and unchangeable. 194 On 10 March 1994, the
Prime Minister of the Czech Republic signed a framework document by which the Czech
Republic subscribed to the project of the Partnership for Peace (P£P). Individual
Programme of Partnership for Peace (TPP) of the Czech Republic, defining both political
and military objectives of the country's co-operation with NATO, was signed on
November 25, 1994. 195
In addition to the multilateral cooperation in the PfP framework, bilateral
cooperation agreements have also been developed. The most intensive contracts have
been maintained with the armed forces of neighbor states and with the NATO states. In
1995, the Czech Army co-operated with 23 states on the basis of plans of bilateral
cooperation or other agreements (Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Canada, France, Germany,
Great Britain, Hungary, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, the Netherlands, Norway, Poland,
Rumania, Russia, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, the Ukraine, the
USA).
193 Vladimir Dubsky, Lidove noviny, October 13, 1997, p. 3. In this connection was
mentioned Rumania, Slovenia, Ukraine and Baltic states. Statements about Slovakia were only
careful.
194
"Krvacet za ceske idealy," Respekt, January 12, 1997, No. 16, p. 3.
195 White Paper on Defence of the Czech Republic (1995), p. 12
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The dimensions of cooperation with the USA are unique. It is
implemented through the Contact Team of the US Armed Forces in Prague within US
Eucom Joint Military to Military Contact Program and through the Security Assistance
Office (SAO) of the US Embassy in Prague. In 1996, the US government, through the
SAO, provided almost $1 million to the International Military Education and Training
(IMET) program of which this author is a beneficiary and almost $9 million to the
Foreign Military Sale (FMS) program, of which $2 million was designated for
English-language training of Czech military personnel in the Czech Republic, a crucial
aspect of interoperability in NATO. 196
b. Policy Coordination
Together with the prospect that the Czech Republic is likely to receive full
membership in NATO in 1997, the security and defense policy of the Czech Republic is
becoming more and more subordinated to future needs expected to arise from the
Alliance membership.
The 1995 White Paper stipulated that full NATO membership is a primary
objective of the Czech Republic in ensuring its security. 197 On 15 March 1996 the Czechs
196 Data provided by negotiations, that author participated in.
197 White Paper on Defence of the Czech Republic (1995), pp. 9 and 12. "The Czech
Republic considers NATO to be at present the basic functional security institution in Europe,
which guarantees the Transatlantic alliance, and on which the stability and security ofEurope
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established a special committee of foreign and defense Ministry personnel -
supplemented by representatives from finance, industry and trade - to coordinate all
activities regarding NATO integration and to produce a "National Plan of Compatibility
with NATO." 198 In addition, the Czech Republic makes some doctrinal documents
according to NATO one. This was confirmed by the Czech Minister of Defense when the
concept of a national defense strategy was proposed at the session of government in the
end of the 1996. 199 Despite these positive steps toward integration into NATO, it is
commonly believed, both by the Czech media and the US administration, 200 that more
could be done in preparation ofjoining NATO.
c. Risk Sharing
Since the very beginning of its existence, the post-communist government
proved that it is ready to share the risks in promoting world peace and security through
NATO. Czech soldiers carry out tasks in a number of peacekeeping or peace support
and the world depend. It plays an important role in securing the process of transformations in Europe."
This document itself an outgrowth of PfP and bilateral cooperation.
198 OMRI Daily Digest, 19 March 1996, p. 4.
199
"Narodni obranna strategie," Respekt . January 26, no. 420.
200
"Vyborny chysta zmeny v resortu," Lidove noviny, October 10, 1997, p. 2. "Frederick
Pang, US Deputy Minister of Defense, pointed out shortcomings in connection with ongoing
the Czech Republic's enter in NATO yesterday." Also: "Tvrde kritizovana Praha se snazi
rychle udobfit NATO," MF Dnes, October 3, 1997, p. 1.
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operations and missions, both as military observers and as members of contingents. In
1990, the former Czechoslovakia sent a military contingent to the Gulf War. A special
chemical unit of 200 men accomplished its mission on the side of US-led coalition. 202
The Czech battalion of 1,000 men was engaged in both UNPROFOR and IFOR
operations on the territory of the former Yugoslavia. 203 Thus the Czech Republic has
shown great willingness to meet the goals of NATO's Partnership for Peace, since
participation in this program is necessary to join the Alliance.
The next factor affecting the Czech Republic's posture in risk-sharing is
the question of nuclear forces and the Alliance's troop deployment on Czech territory.
Despite the fact that "forward defense" is not on the table now, public polls show that
question of nuclear forces deployment is relatively sensitive. Only 18 percent would
support NATO membership, if it meant deploying nuclear weapons on Czech soil. 204 In
early January 1 996, the government approved a law prohibiting any kind of nuclear
weapons on the territory of the Czech Republic. Since the language in the bill raised
201 White Paper on Defence of the Czech Republic (1995), p. 1 1. "Until May 1995 more than
4,000 members of the military forces were involved in the UN and OSCE missions. The
experience of the Czechoslovak Army of sending military observers dates from 1989 when in
January (sic) Czechoslovakia was asked to participate in the UNAVEM mission in Angola
(sic) and in March of the same year in the UNTAG mission in Namibia. In total, 453 military
observers have operated in 14 missions of the United Nations, the European Union and the
OSCE on the territory of 10 states - Angola, Georgia, Iraq, former Yugoslavia, Korea,
Liberia, Moldavia, Mozambique, Namibia, Somalia, up to 1 March 1995."
202 White Paper on Defence of the Czech Republic H995). p. 11.
203 White Paper on Defence of the Czech Republic (1995V p. 1 1.
204 Mlada fronta DNES, 23 May, 1996, p. 2.
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questions about whether this restriction would have a negative impact on the Czech
Republic's ability to join NATO, 205 when the Parliament's Budget Committee approved
the law on 28 March, it added the following amendment: "unless an international treaty
states otherwise."206
As far as deployment of foreign troops on the Czech soil, Article 39 of the
Constitution of the Czech Republic demands approval from both chambers of
Parliament. 207 On 29 April 1994, Parliament approved the government proposal to permit
short-term military training and exercises on Czech soil (5,000 foreign troops for up to
30 days). 208
Although Czechs are aware of the plausible risks resulting from
participation in peacekeeping operations, they continue to contribute to the promotion of
peace and security. 209 Because of their experiences in the WTO, the Czech people at
peace time would not support the deployment of nuclear forces or foreign troops on their
soil.
205 Mlada fronta DNES, 5 February 1996, p. 1.
206 Ceska tiskova agentura, 28 March 1996.
207
Constitution of the Czech Republic, Article 39, paragrph (3). "Decisions on declarations of
war and approval of the presence of foreign troops on the territory of the Czech Republic
shall require the consent of more than half of all Deputies and more than half of all Senators."
208 FBIS-EEU-94-117 (17 June 1994), p. 13.
209




At the stage as of late 1997 of the Czech Republic's integration process
into the Alliance, the notion of burden-sharing includes, in the short term, a contribution
to UN/CSCE peacekeeping operations, and, in the long-term, the buildup of forces which
will be able to operate better with NATO forces. 210 Indeed, when it becomes a member
of the Alliance, the Czech Republic will cover 0.9 percent of the annual NATO budget
for the first year, which is about $15 million (Poland 2.48 percent or $42 mil., Hungary
0.65 percent or $1 lmil.). Although the current level of contributions to the UN/OSCE
peacekeeping operations are satisfactory, the allocation of resources for building up the
Czech Army has been found by NATO to be insufficient, and has been heavily criticized,
especially by the USA. 211
However, the Czech government has been focusing on economic reforms,
and critical reductions in the military budget, from about 25 percent of the state budget
before 1990212 to 2.3 percent in 1995. 213 As social and welfare programs have been
radically reduced in scale, so have military expenditures. In fact, the military lacks
housing for over 3,000 officers and their families. 214
210 Programme Partnership for Peace
211
Jan Gazdik, "Kongres pfeje vstupu zemi do NATO, nad stavem obrany vsak nejasa,"
Mlada fronta DNES . May 21, 1997.
212
Jones, p. 311.
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The cuts of the military budget, moreover, have struck not only the
personal lives of military personnel, but also the direct readiness of the armed forces in
general. In 1995, the Air Force received only 25 percent of the resources that was
requested for operations, which caused a lack of funds for spare parts and fuel. Thus,
pilots were flying only 50 hours per year, seriously below NATO standards. 215
As a direct consequence of the worsening economic situation in the Spring
of 1997, further reductions were made in the military budget in April. To save money,
the Ministry of Defense canceled all upgrading projects which had not yet been
contracted. On June 7, 1997, Minister of Defense Vyborny announced that "the military
was forced by restrictions to live on threshold values."216 At the end of July 1997, the
Minister announced to the government that half the aircrafts belonging to the tactical air
force were not able to fly.
217
Trends in defense expenditures also directly influence other defense
resources. In searching for spares, military units, unlike recently approved defense planes,
will leave 43 military garrisons until 2000. 218 Consequently, young officers, including
those educated in western military academies and war colleges, have been leaving the
215
Jeffrey Simon, NATO Enlargement , p. 227.
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Jaroslav Kmenta, "Polovina stroju taktickeho letectva neni schopna letu," Mlada fronta
DNES
. August 8, 1997.
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"Armada opousti 43 mest a obci," Pravo , May 28, 1997.
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military services.
219 Annually, about 2,500 officers, out of a total of about 24,000 officer
corps, leave the military service; the most common reasons given are the bad situation in
the military, and low prospects for their career. 220 During the work on the budget
proposal for 1998, moreover, the Minister of Finance increased general anxiety by his
request not to increase the defense budget, despite a recent government decision to do
so.
221
After pressure from the US administration, the Czech government promised to
increase the annual defense budget to 0. 1 percent, amounting to a total budget
expenditure of 2.7 percent in 2000.
While the Czech Republic actively participates in UN/OSCE peacekeeping
operations, its contributions to its own defense are totally insufficient. Given
proclamations of the Czech government that the Czech Republic is ready to subordinate
to the Alliance in case of need 90 percent of the military units, 222 cannot remove the
critical doubts among allies about whether the Czech Republic's contributions to the
concept of collective defense have been worthwhile.
What are the main points of the Czech Republic's security and defense policy? In
its security policy (after overcoming naive notions about a revolutionary rebuilding of the
219
"Vyborny chysta zmeny v resortu," Lidove Noviny, October 10, 1997, p. 1.
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"V ODS se rozhofela bitva o armadu."Mlada fronta - DNES . September 5, 1997.
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"Tvrde kritizovana Praha se snazi udobfit NATO," Mlada fronta DNES, October 3, 1997,
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European security architecture, and attempts to resuscitate an extended Little Entente)
the Czechoslovak government turned toward NATO. The Czech government decided to
stay on this track, and, moreover, deepen cooperation and attain full integration in the
Alliance.
Regarding defense cooperation, the Czech Republic, after US critics, overcame its
initial reluctance to cooperate closely with the countries of the Visegrad group.
Cooperation with NATO partners was developed within the individual program
Partnership for Peace and bilateral agreements, with special emphasize placed on
developing close cooperation with the USA.
Regarding policy coordination, the Czech Republic has, because of its desire to
become a member ofNATO, subordinated its defense policy to NATO. The military
doctrine was based on the goal to attain full compatibility with NATO. However, the
Czech public is convinced that the government does not pay enough attention to the
Czech Republic's integrating process to NATO.
Although the officials of the Alliance assured Czech citizens that NATO does not
aim to deploy nuclear forces or the Alliance's troops in the country, 223 the Czech
legislature has left its options open and enables deployment both nuclear forces and
foreign troops on the Czech soil. Credible burden-sharing still remains as a problem.
Although the limited engagement of of the Czech contingent in the US-led coalition in
the GulfWar and in the former Yugoslavia was seen as positive by western allies, the
223
"Solana: NATO nechysta nove rozmisteni jadernych zbrani," Pravo, February 13, 1997, p.
4.
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process of building up efficient armed forces has been seen as critical by future NATO
partners. As a result, the Czech government, under pressure from the US in this phase of
integration into NATO, has been willing to revise its decisions and allocate a greater
share of the state budget to defense expenses.
2. Strategic Political Culture
The evolution of the strategic political culture of the transitional, post-communist
Czech society was initially characterized by strong political consensus on the
political-reform procedures to attain civilian-democratic control over the military.
Afterwards however, certain defense issues were politicized and became subject to
disputes within the government coalition. This process was accompanied by apathy
among Czech citizens, caused partially by the traditionally low status of the military in
society, and partially by the nonpersuasive performance of government officials. External
pressure from future allies partially restored the necessary consensus forimplementing
the defense policy.
a. Political Consensus
Political consensus is the core of a pluralistic democracy. A high measure
of consensus over a large part of the domestic political spectrum is fuel for a transition to
democracy. Needless to say, the means of attaining political consensus is one factor that
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distinguishes democracy from authoritarian regimes. In a democracy, consensus is a
process rather than a mandate. If consensus is attained through a process of discussing
opinions among competitive political strengths from the bottom to the top, then it is
democratic. If the consensus is the result of an authority's directive from the top to the
bottom, then it is dictatorial. Once consensus is achieved democratically, it becomes
stronger by virtue of its ability to conform to the times.Thus, the means of attaining
political consensus in the Czech Republic, from the bottom to the top, has generated mild
optimism, even though the current level of consensus needs to change dramatically.
Firstly, the government coalition (the rightist ODS, the right-centrist
ODA, and the Christian democratic KDU-CSL) is not cohesive enough. The coalition
partners ODS and ODA have politicized defense policy issues in order to advance in the
struggle for power inside the coalition against the KDU-CSL, the ruling Ministry of
Defense of the Czech Republic since January 1993. 224 On one hand, the ODS and ODA
vehemently criticize the problems in the military, while rejecting co-accountability for
defense policy at the same time. 225 On the other hand, they refuse all KDU-CSL initiatives
in military sale and/or acquisition projects, 226 in military doctrine, 227 and in legislative
issues to improve the situation in the Czech Army. This is all carried out while the
224
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defense budget, as a percentage of GDP, has been reduced step by step. 228 The ODA and
ODS refused to increase the defense budget unless the KDU-CSL makes it more
transparent.
229 These struggles within the governing coalition eroded initial consensus
over military reform policy in the early 1990's.
Secondly, major political opposition (the Social Democrats - CSSD) has
not been persuasive enough. This phenomenon is caused by Social Democrats' fuzzy
posture with respect to the Czech Republic's membership in NATO, and they give weak
public support to the party's electorial program containing support for NATO. The
CSSD supports the country's admission into NATO, but it insists that the Czech Republic
pass a referendum, something which is not allowed for in the Czech constitution, but
which the CSSD wants to change through the passing of a bill authorizing the
referendum. 230 The party claims further that it would not consider the result of the
referendum as an obligatory consideration in government decision-making. Moreover,
support among CSSD voters to join NATO is at its lowest. According to a poll by the
IWM (Institut pro vyzkum verejneho mineni - Institut for Survey of Public Poles) in
April 1997, only 29 percent ofCSSD voters support joining NATO (83 percent ODS, 61
percent ODA, and 53 percent KDU-CSL). 231
228




"Referendum dostalo sanci jen na chvili," Mlada fronta DNES, October 16, 1997, p 2.
231
"Koalice, opozice a NATO," Pravo, April 29, 1997, p.2.
114
Thirdly, the marginal parties of the political spectrum (the extremely
right-wing SPR-RPSC and the extremely left-wing KSCM) clearly formulated an attitude
towards NATO enlargement. Both the Republicans (SPR-RPSC), with 8 percent of the
electorate in the 1996 elections, and the Communists (KSCM), with 10.3 percent, are
strictly against joining NATO. In addition, the KSCM boasts a charismatic personality in
the figure of Miroslav Vacek, the former Minister of Defense, a politician who also
enjoys the confidence of post-communist president Havel, and has a great deal of
military expertise. 232
Finally, interest groups have not developed the necessary pressure to
influence major elements of the political spectrum. Early after 1990, some new
associations emerged and committed themselves fairly resolutely to exert democratic
pressure in order to attain civilian control over the military. The Association of Military
Renewal (SVO) participated in the development of military doctrine; the Union of
Professional Soldiers (SVP) defended the social welfare of servicemen and participated in
cadre issues; and the Congress of the Free Legion (SL) promoted the goals of reducing
army enrollment, professionalizing the force, and reducing a mandatory military service to
12-month. However, there are serious doubts about their influence in the process of
expanding the military, since they have essentially disappeared from public life. Overall,
their influence was diminished not only by enormous reductions in military production,
but also by the dis-acknowledgement of the RDP Group (a consortium of armament
companies) by the Ministry of Defense. A more influential role can be expected of the
232
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new Association of the Defense Industry, founded in the second half of 1997, and linking
60 domestic companies.
Thus, the effort to unify the strengths of Czech political spectrum around
long-term goals of defense policy is still fragmented due to political discrepancies within
the governing coalition, to ambiguous support by major political opposition groups, to
the decisively negative attitude of marginal parties who represent 18% of the electorate,
and to the impotence of interest groups. Such a low political consensus must affect the
support of citizens negatively.
b. Support of Citizens
Robert Putnam, among others, has expressed the importance of "social
capital" in democracy. 233 Support among the citizenry, a basic element of the social
capital, is important both for great and small democratic states alike. Since the Czech
people put more trust in the economic reforms of the post-communist transitional
government than they put into the political reforms, their support for defense policy is
generally very low. According to the IWM, only 34 percent of the citizens trusted the
Czech Army in October 1997, and 52 percent did not. 234 The confidence level is low
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among the Czech people not only in relation to their own military, but also in relation to
NATO.
After the beginning of governmental campaign to increase support of
citizens to NATO, which started immediately before NATO Summit in Madrid (July 8,
1997), a stable 46 percent of the citizens supported the Alliance in July 1997. 235 Jan
Herzmann, director of the survey company "Factum," summarized the causes of the low
37 percent support among citizens for NATO in June 1997: above all current economic
and political situation and connecting uncertainty of peoples.The public does not feel any
immediate threat. In fact, 52 percent of the opponents to NATO membership criticize
the perceived financial costs ofNATO membership. 236
In another survey, a strong correlation between negative sentiment and
certain economic figures was also found. That is, together with decline in supporters of
NATO membership, from 60 percent in October 1993 to 47 percent in March 1996, 237
Nominal Wage Growth declined from 25.3 percent in 1993 to 18 percent in 1996. 238
Recent polls showing support for joining NATO among about half of the population 239
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are alarming when contrasted with the 90 percent percent support among Polish citizens
for NATO enlargement. 240 As J. Simon concludes in his study about NATO enlargement,
"It seems that one of the Czech government's most difficult tasks will be to 'sell' NATO
to Czech society...." 241
c. Public Support ofPolitical Leaders
Support of Czech politicians varies from person to person, but it is
considered as generally lackluster in Czech society. 242 In contrast, President Vaclav
Havel has fervently supported NATO enlargement. He appeals to two audiences:
domestic and international. He explains in his interviews and speeches the reasons why
the Czech Republic should join NATO, while pointing out the democratic character of
NATO at the same time. He formulated he reasons for joining NATO as early as
November 1993, which are basically that "no large European conflict has left Central
Europe untouched, the Czech Republic is part of West European civilization and shares
NATO's values, and the Czech Republic's geopolitical situation is precarious." 243
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However, he was convinced ofNATO's democratic character even in 1991, as can be
gleaned from his comments, with an obvious reference to the Prague Spring of 1968:
NATO is truly a defensive organization, and truly democratic:
members can withdraw at any time, and they have equal rights within it.
Realistically, the Americans have and will always have a greater say in
NATO than, say, Portugal; still, nothing would happen to Portugal were it
to decide to quit NATO or eliminate NATO bases on its territory. 244
Since Havel believes that membership in the alliance does not restrict
state sovereignty, he refuses to hold a referendum that might threaten the Czech
Republic's acceptance into NATO.
With respect to the international audience, the President appeals to
decision-makers both in Europe and in the United States to influence the ratification of
NATO enlargement in the Czech Republic's favor. While receiving the Fulbright Award
in the USA in October of 1997, he warned against American isolationism and pointed
out the role of America in the diversified and decentralized world after the fall of the iron
curtain. 245
A week later in the Council of Europe, Havel addressed European
governments and warned them against selfishness. 246 This can be interpreted as an effort
to compel European governments to consider the US administration's demand that they
share a larger portion ofNATO enlargement expenses.
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In sharp contrast to the President's effort is the Prime Minister's passivity.
While entirely neglecting domestic citizens, Vaclav Klaus proclaimed at the EU Summit
on December 9, 1994 that: "When (sic) emphasize our ambitions regarding NATO, I
emphasize the demand for an American presence in Europe...."247 This was seen as a
positive signal. However, Klaus limited his coverage of the NATO issue in subsequent
addresses to international audiences to ensuring western allies that the Czech government
is ready to keep its promise to increase its defense budget. 248 This downward trend in
coverage happened even after the open criticisms of former US Secretary of State
Warren Christopher.
Josef Zieleniec, the former Minister of Foreign Affairs, demonstrated
public support for NATO enlargement only formaly. In his arguments, he emphasized the
geo-strategic situation of the country and the share of responsibility the Alliance bore in
maintaining a fifty-year peace in Europe. 249 His decision to appoint his Deputy Minister to
replace him in negotiations with the Alliance after the NATO Summit in Madrid was
perceived, however, as a negative signal. Unlike the Czech Republic, the Polish and
Hungarian delegations were headed by their Ministers of Foreign Affairs. In October
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1997, Zieleniec resigned and was replaced by Jaroslav Sedivy, Ambassador to Belgium.
It is generally expected that Sedivy will fulfill well the role of the Minister of Foreign
Affairs in the process of integrating the Czech Republic into NATO.
The strategic political culture of the Czech Republic is in the process of
democratic development. Its main characteristics are: 1) a low level of political consensus
in constructive phase of national defense reform (which was caused by the politicizing of
defense policy issues); 2) a low level of support for security and defense policy among
Czech citizens; 3) a unilateral effort among political elites to emphasize to the Alliance
the domestic shortcomings of Czech participation in NATO, instead of galvanizing Czech
citizens to support defense policies; and 4) a lack of will and discipline within the
domestic political spectrum to subordinate local short-term interests to national ong-term
defense policy objectives. The necessary level of political consensus has only been
reached after an external impulse from the leading member of the Alliance.
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IV. CONCLUSIONS: LESSONS FOR THE CZECH REPUBLIC
This part of the study summarizes the experiences that put the Dutch on the road
to such a profitable position for a small state in the Alliance. Then it will analyze the main
correlations between the Dutch and Czech cases. Afterwards, the study will review the
main characteristics of the Czech republic's position in NATO. Finally, certain
recommendations for the Czech policy-makers-will be proposed.
A. DUTCH EXPERIENCE
The Netherlands of the 1990's is seen as a reliable ally within the North Atlantic
Treaty Organization. It enjoys high esteem among its partners in the coalition. The Dutch
officials and military participate actively in various executive positions within the
Alliance's institutional structures. Their influence on the decision-making process is
remarkable. Moreover, the Dutch armed forces cooperate in important tasks in the
defense of the Alliance. 250 However, such a respectable position was not destiny. It was
developed deliberately by a generation ofDutch policy makers.
Taking into consideration all the constraints on the Dutch resulting from its
national history, its geo-strategic situation and its economic situation, the Dutch post
World War II government decided to reorient security and defense policy and make the
strategic decision to join the Alliance with other western democracies.
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The specific historical factors which influenced that decision were: 1) the decline
of its colonial power and its transformation into a small power in international affairs; 2)
its precarious policy of neutrality and its inability to protect itself from larger powers; 3)
the large spectrum of consequences from World War II for the Dutch nation and country;
and 4) circumstances, threats, and risks in the post World War II disorder.
The Dutch geo-strategic constraints were not any less important, however.
Located at the crossroads of Weste- Europe between two great powers, the
Netherlands, though possessing strategic energetic deposits, is small, with large part of its
terrain under sea level.
Finally, a lack of logical harmony between the economic policy and the security
system, significant economic exploitation of the country during the Nazi occupation, and
a plan for economic recovery were the economic factors that, along with the historical
experience and geographical limits, led the Dutch to abandon its policy of neutrality and
participate in building a democratic collective defense system, at first through the
Brussels Treaty and later, in 1949, through NATO.
Having made this important strategic decision, the Netherlands began its hard
work of position-building within the Alliance. The Dutch Security and defense policy and
strategic political culture were the primary position-building modulators in that process.
The security and defense policy conducted during the beginning of the Netherlands'
membership in the organization was distinguished by a high degree of conformity to
NATO's strategic concept, a high degree of close defense cooperation with allies, and a
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pragmatic attitude towards demands for risk-taking and burden-sharing in collective
defense.
This policy approach was strengthened even further by the strategic political
culture of the Dutch. This mature political culture has been noted for cohesive political
consensus on security and defense issues, overwhelming public support of political
leaders involved in Euro-Atlantic defense, and support of the government's security and
defense policy by a majority ofDutch citizens.
This security and defense policy, which is supported by the strategic political
culture and which respects the historical, geo-strategic and economic constraints that led
to alignment, has built up for the Netherlands a position of reliable ally in NATO. This
position within the Alliance has enabled the Netherlands to enjoy a high level of security
from collective defense.
B. COMPARISON OF THE DUTCH AND CZECH CASES
This part of the thesis compared both case studies and analyzed their similarities
and differences in order to discover opportunities and constraints in the process of the
Czech Republic's position-building within NATO.
1. Lessons from History
Although the historical events of the two countries have taken place in different
places and at different times, there are some general similarities. First, both states
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became small powers after having been larger. This "smallness," in turn, limited their
security options.
Second, both states had exercised foreign policies based on concepts other
than collective defense. In both cases, this crucial mistake paved the way for a rapid
occupation by a neighboring great power, namely, Germany.
Third, the invasion in both cases had critical consequences for the state
and nation. Moreover, Czechoslovakia repeated this critical mistake once again when it
allied with others in an undemocratic system of collective defense.
These experiences, together with uncertainties, threats, and risks at the
time of strategic decision-making, led to the decision to join the democratic system of
collective defense after World War II in the Dutch case, and after the Cold War in the
Czech case.
2. Geo-strategic Situations
The two countries also share similarities in their geographical locations at two
different crossroads of European powers. Both states, lying as they do on the boundaries
ofNATO, serve as buffer states for Germany and the strategic NATO facilities placed
there. Both countries also have strategic natural resources. And while the terrain in both
countries provides no added natural protection, the Netherlands' low altitude actually
increase vulnerability of the state. Also, unlike the Netherlands, the Czech Republic is a
landlocked country, and this fact reduces country's opportunity to contribute to naval
defense of the Alliance.
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3. Economic Factors
The Netherlands as well as Czechoslovakia learned the lesson that discrepancies
between their respective economic policies and systems of external security increase the
threat to a small state's security. Both countries learned that a weak security system can
encourage an aggressor to take over a small state's developed economy. To avoid recent
mistakes, both countries aligned their respective strategic-economic and security
decisions during their effort to attain a quick economic recovery and long-term
prosperity.
In comparing the constraints from Dutch history with the equivalent constraints in
the Czech case, it seems that there are either no or few Dutch historical specifics in that
regard which have determined the destiny of the Dutch position in NATO. In determining
its own destiny, however, the Czech Republic has emphasized the circumstances of the
Munich Agreement of 1938 251 and the events in Prague during the Spring of 1968.
The Czech Republic, also unlike the Netherlands, has no direct access to the
ocean. And as the socialist state-planned economy, with its extended social and welfare
programs, is being replaced by free market relations. The Czech Republic, in its
251 Vaclav Havel, Summer Meditations
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attempt to make the transition to this free-market economy, has had to rebuild its entire
economic infrastructure.
4. Security and Defense Policies
The security and defense policies of both countries also share similarities. Firstly,
both governments hoped enthusiastically for a system of collective security. Although
they have both abandoned the idea of collective security as the main guarantor of their
external security, they still highly support the United Nations as the main promotor of
peace and security in the world. Indeed, small states in general typically find this forum to
be a vehicle through which to discipline great powers verbally, a moralistic tendency
which applies to the Netherlands and the Czech Republic as well.
Secondly, while the Netherlands has developed a high level of cooperation in all
areas of defense with special emphasis on regional cooperation and trans-Atlantic links,
the cooperation of the Czech Republic within the Central European region has been
developed step by step with special bilateral attention always paid to the United States.
Thirdly, the security and defense policy of the Netherlands is fully subordinated to
NATO's strategic concept. The Czech Republic has taken similar practical steps toward
harmonizing its doctrinal documents in this regard.
Finally, both countries are ready to share the risks of collective defense and
security. Both the Netherlands and the Czech Republic participated to a limited degree in
the Gulf War and in the conflict in the former Yugoslavia. Both countries have
participated in various UN missions and peacekeeping operations. While the Netherlands
128
has already fulfilled its nuclear obligations and built international military units, the
legislative provisions of the Czech constitution do not exclude the chance to employ
nuclear means of strategic deterrence or NATO troops. Both countries, however, have
military systems based on conscription, which causes certain difficulties in the rapid
deployment of armed forces in "out-of-NATO areas."
The essential difference between the two countries is in their respective readiness
to share the current burden of collective defense. While the Dutch economy enables the
Dutch to allocate relatively large resources to its defense budget, the Czech Republic has
reduced its defense budget to what it considers a more acceptable level. Historically
however, the Netherlands was also extremely reluctant to increase defense expenses
during the initial phase of of its NATO membership. Coincidently, both countries, in
order not to threaten their transatlantic links, were willing to increase their defense
spending after assertive pressure from the American administration.
5. Strategic Political Cultures
Similar to the case of the Dutch Minister of Foreign Affairs, J. A. Luns, the Czech
Republic found an outstanding supporter of Euro-Atlantic defense in the person of
President Vaclav Havel. Unlike in the Netherlands, politicians in the Czech Republic do
not propagandize their security and defense policy among the Czech population.
Consequently, Czechs have little confidence in their armed forces and tend not to support
the integration of the Czech Republic into NATO. Moreover, unlike the strong political
consensus in the Netherlands at the time of its accession to NATO, the Czech Republic's
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political spectrum is critically fragmented in terms of opinions on the implementation of
security and defense policy.
The specifics of the Dutch security and defense policy and strategic political
culture which contributed most significantly to the image of the Dutch as a reliable ally
are: 1) its high level of regional cooperation within Europe and its close bilateral
cooperation with USA; 2) the subordination of its military doctrine to the NATO agenda;
3) its participation in risk-sharing and burden-sharing; 4) its upgraded armed forces; 5) its
strong political consensus on, and relatively strong citizen support of security and defense
policy; and 6) the fact that its political leaders dealing with security and defense policy
enjoy great support in society, and have, themselves, a great deal of impact on the
citizens.
The constraints that have had a negative impact on Czech Republic's beginning
position in the Alliance can be gleaned from an analysis of the position-building
modulators: a weak economy, weak armed forces, a military concept based on
conscription, traditionally low support of the military within society, 252 and little political
consensus.
On the other hand, the factors operating in the Czech Republic that imply
opportunity are: 1) its tendency to use moral appeal in international relations; 2) its
promotion of regional cooperation among NATO partners of the same political,
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economic, military, social, and cultural backgrounds; 3) its close relationship with the
United States; 4) its continual process of subordinating security and defense policy to
NATO's policies; 5) its readiness to share collective-defense risks; 6) its participation in
UN missions and operations; and 7) its willingness to share in important defense tasks
resulting from its location on the boundaries of the alliance.
C. REFLECTIONS OF THE FUTURE ROLE THE CZECH REPUBLIC IN
NATO
As can be interpreted from the previous analyses, the Czech Republic may not
easily expect any special position within NATO that would allow greater influence in the
decision making-process. The Czech Republic will belong to a category of smaller NATO
members, composed currently of the Netherlands, Belgium, Denmark, Norway, Portugal
and Greece. From strategic point of view, the Czech Republic will be become attached
under the Supreme Allied Commander (SHAPE) in Europe (SACEUR). From a regional
point of view, the Czech Republic will be under the Commander-in-Chief of the Allied
Forces of Central Europe (CINCENT). 253
Since the new military structure will have headquarters only in the North and
South, the Czech Republic will belong to the North command, together with Germany
and Poland. Thus, Czech Republic's partner in NATO will be the USA and its troops
located in Germany, Poland, Britain, Germany, the Netherlands, Belgium, Denmark, and
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Norway. 254 Within that group the Czech Republic will play, of course, a role similar to
that of the Netherlands, Denmark, and Norway: a buffer state on NATO's northern
boundaries.
The contribution of the Czech Republic will also be limited in several ways. Since
the Czech Republic is a landlocked country without direct access to the ocean, such
future contribution to collective defense will be limited to such cases as are Luxembourg
and Hungary. As far as Czech air and ground support is concerned however, Czech
equipment is obsolete, its crews are not sufficiently trained, and the officer corps is
demoralized by several factors, including the slow progress of defense reform, and
economic constraints on the armed forces. Moreover, anti-air defense, which will likely
be the Czech Republic's main task in the alliance, is based on obsolete Soviet equipment.
Overall therefore, the Czech Republic may well be seen by critics and allies more as a
consumer of security benefits than as a contributor to collective defense.
Nevertheless, due to the Czech geographical location of the country, its large
industrial base, and its tradition in armament production, the Atlantic allies will provide
both assistance and surely apply pressure at the same time to force the Czech government
to build up credible defense capabilities. At the same time, however, the country will be
seen by the allies as a junior partner, willing to share risks but needing a certain level of
senior leadership to attain the desired level of interoperability. To attain this level as soon
as possible, the Czech Republic's government must alter certain crucial points in its





What should the Czech Republic do in order to attain a better position within
NATO? Together with economic growth, the Czech policy makers must view national
security as its highest priority. The importance of this issue is clear from an analysis of the
historical, geo-strategical and economic factors affecting the Czech Republic. Thus far,
however, the words and deeds of the Czech Republic do not match. In the area of the
security and defense policy, Czech policy makers must:
• re-adopt the security and defense policy initiatives that Czechoslovakia
maintained in the early 1990's concerning the Middle European region, and
deepen its cooperation within the Visegrad group and other regional PfP
partners with Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council and NATO membership
frameworks;
• intensify the process of interoperability its policy doctrines, norms and systems
to those ofNATO in order to attain compatibility, standardization,
interchangeability, and commonality within the larger organization;
• maintain the current level of contributions to UN missions and peacekeeping
operations;
• allocate more resources without delay in order to start the systematic and
buildup of small, yet modern and efficient armed forces;
• whenever possibly together with democratic processes generate the necessary
level of cohesive political consensus to meet objectives of the security and
defense policy;
• formalize a clear Czech posture regarding issues of national security, and seek,
when appropriate, demonstrate public support for that posture and build
concensus;
• where possible, explain policy to the public in credible fashion.
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Despite its current mixed image in the eyes of its future allies, the Czech Republic
has the potential to contribute a great deal. This potential can be seen in the country's
historical, cultural, economic, and democratic traditions. It is up to the citizens of the
Czech Republic, however, to encourage their political representatives to obtain a secure
future as well as respect of the NATO allies.
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